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Don Leatherman examines the scope of the General Utilities repeal
and discusses how the repeal should be implemented.
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I. Introduction
More than a quarter of a century ago, Congress
repealed the General Utilities doctrine, authorizing
the Treasury to issue regulations to prevent circumvention of the repeal. Although the Treasury has
issued several sets of regulations in response, it has
never systematically defined the scope of the repeal.
Instead, the regulations and other administrative guidance more selectively attack concerns raised by the
repeal, almost all of which arise because of the dual
nature of stock: A corporate shareholder can choose
to treat a subsidiary’s stock as a separate asset or, in
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certain cases, as an indirect interest in subsidiary
assets, a choice facilitated by Code Sec. 332, the
consolidated return regulations, the reorganization
provisions and the interplay of Subchapter C and
passthrough regimes.1 Unchecked, that choice would
allow corporations to readily avoid the repeal, but
the choice has been severely restricted by Congress
and the Treasury.
This article considers the extent to which the response should be further developed and refined. It
concludes that the Treasury and the Internal Revenue
Service (the IRS) should adopt a general rule to implement the repeal. It also concludes that they should
simplify the uniform loss rules under Reg. §1.1502-36
and bring final Proposed Reg. §1.337(d)-3 with some
modifications. This article first considers the scope of
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The Scope of the General Utilities Repeal
the General Utilities repeal before considering how
the repeal should be implemented. It ends with a
brief conclusion.2

II. Scope of the Repeal
A. The General Utilities Doctrine
Under the General Utilities doctrine, a corporation
recognizes neither gain nor loss on its distribution
of property to its shareholders. The doctrine can
be traced to the Supreme Court case that bears its
name, General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering.3 In that case, a corporation was poised to sell
an appreciated asset when its counsel realized that
the sale and later distribution of the sales proceeds
would result in two levels of tax, a corporate tax on
the sale and a shareholder tax on the distribution.
To avoid the corporate tax, the corporation instead
distributed the appreciated asset to its shareholders,
who reported a shareholder-level dividend but took
a fair market value basis in the distributed asset. The
shareholders then quickly sold the asset, recognizing
no further income or gain.
The IRS vigorously argued that the corporation
should also be taxed on the distribution, an argument
that evo
evolved
olved
d as the case wound its way through Board
of Tax
Appeals,
and the
T A
Ta
Appeeals,
l the
t Circuit Court of Appeals
pp
Supreme
Court.
up
prem
me C
ourtt.
t Although
A
ugh he convinced
convin ed the circuit
court,
the
IRS
fell
levels.
ourt, th
he IR
RS fe
ell short
rt at the other
o
vels.
Board
off Tax
Appeals,
Att thee Bo
oard
do
T x Appea
ls, he argued
a gued that
th the
distributing
corporation
declared
dividend
tributing
ib ti corp
rat
had d
ared a cash
h di
of about $
$1 million and satisfied the dividend obligation by distributing appreciated
property,
pre ateed pr
operty, tthereby
herebyy
recognizing gain under the
predecessor
Code
he p
decessor tto
oC
Co
de SSec.
e .
4
1001. The court rejected that argument because in
fact the corporation declared a dividend of the asset
and not a dividend of cash.
On appeal, the IRS argued in addition that the property sale, though in form made by the shareholders,
should be attributed to the corporation.5 Although
the court of appeals favored the new argument,6 the
Supreme Court, on appeal, rejected it on procedural
grounds (i.e., that it was raised for the first time on
appeal).7 The Supreme Court also sided with the trial
court (and circuit court) on the first argument (i.e.,
that the distributed asset was not used to satisfy a
corporate debt).8
In its Supreme Court brief, the IRS advanced yet a
third argument—that a corporation must recognize
taxable income on a distribution of appreciated
property to its shareholders since the transfer was

a “sale or other disposition” under what is now
Code Sec. 1001. In its decision, the Supreme Court
greeted this argument with a studied silence, and
commentators disagreed about whether the Court
rejected the third argument on the merits or on procedural grounds (i.e., because it was raised too late
in the proceeding).9 Despite the Court’s silence, the
former explanation became popular with courts (and
of course practitioners), and the General Utilities
doctrine was born.10
In 1954, Congress codified that doctrine in Code
Sec. 311(a), a section providing that no gain or loss
was recognized to a corporation on a distribution
of property with respect to its stock.11 It provided a
companion nonrecognition rule for liquidating distributions under Code Sec. 336.12 By enacting those
rules, Congress blessed a partial integration of the
corporate and individual tax regimes.13 It recognized,
however, that despite its merits, the codification
raised some administrative and systemic concerns.14
As part of the codification, Congress addressed an
administrative concern raised by the Court Holding
Company doctrine.15 In that case, a corporation negotiated the sale of an appreciated asset in anticipation
of liquidation, reaching an oral agreement with a
buyer about the terms and conditions of sale. Alerted
by counsel that its sale would result in a significant
tax, the corporation instead liquidated, distributing
the asset to its two shareholders, a husband and wife.
Three days later, the shareholders sold the asset on
the previously agreed terms to the same buyer. If
form were respected, there was no corporate-level
tax.
The
Court co
concluded,
however,
that
ax. Th
e SSupreme
uprem
me Cou
C
ncl ded ho
wever, th
the
he sshareholders
hareh lder served
serv as a conduit
condu t for
or a sale
sale byy the
th
16
corporation. In substance, therefore, the corporation
was treated as selling the asset, incurring a tax and
then distributing the sales proceeds in liquidation to
its shareholders, who also incurred a tax.
By way of contrast, in Cumberland Public Service,17 the Supreme Court refused to recast a similar
transaction, concluding that the shareholders of a
liquidating corporation had sold the corporation’s
assets, not as a conduit for the corporation but in
their individual capacities.18 As in Court Holding
Co., the Supreme Court reached its conclusion by
relying on the trial court’s characterization of the
transaction. That reliance created uncertainty in
planning similar transactions.
Congress addressed that uncertainty in 1954 with
Code Sec. 337.19 Under that provision, a corporation recognized no gain or loss if it sold property
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after it adopted a plan of liquidation, as long as the
liquidation occurred within 12 months following
that adoption. This rule eased, but did not eliminate, the administrative concern raised by the Court
Holding Co. doctrine.20
In addition to addressing that administrative concern, Congress realized that nonrecognition under
the General Utilities doctrine should not be absolute. First, if a corporation used the last-in, last-out
inventory method, Code Sec. 311(b) provided that
the corporation could recognize gain on its distribution of inventory assets.21 Second, under Code
Sec. 311(c), a corporation also recognized gain to
the extent that a shareholder assumed a liability in
connection with a property distribution and the liability exceeded the adjusted basis of the distributed
property.22 Finally, in legislative history, Congress
acknowledged that despite the General Utilities
doctrine, a corporation may include an amount
in gross income under the assignment-of-income
doctrine on its distribution of property.23
Over time, courts continued to chip away at the
General Utilities doctrine.24 Beginning in 1969,
Congress also began to erode the doctrine,25 adding exceptions to the nonrecognition rule of Code
Sec. 31
311(a),
11(a), eexceptions that by 1984 had all but
26
swallowed
waallow
ll wed
d the
h rule.
r
Finally, in the Revenue Act of
1986
(the
“1986
Congress
overturned
98
86 (t
the “198
198
86 Act”),
”), Con
gress ov
erturned most
remaining
doctrine.27
em
mainiingg vestiges
v ige
vesti
g of the
th General
er Utilities
tiess doc
Code
311(b)
now
provides
corporation
Cod
de Sec.
Seec. 311(
3
(b) n
w provid
es that if a corpo
makes
kkes a nonliquidating
no
onliq
li ida
d
g distribution
distr tion off appreciated
property ((other than the distributing corporation’s
own obligation) to a shareholder,
reh der, it recognizes
rrecognizes gain
gain
n
as if it had sold the property
ope to the shareholder
shareholder att
fair market value. (Under Code Sec. 311(a), it recognizes no loss on a corresponding distribution of loss
property.) Further, as a general rule, Code Sec. 336(a)
provides that a corporation recognizes gain or loss
on its liquidating distribution of appreciated property.

B. The General Utilities Repeal
In overturning, or “repealing,” that doctrine (an action commonly called the “General Utilities repeal”),
Congress offered tantalizing hints about the scope of
the repeal, both in the relevant legislative history and
in the sections passed in conjunction with the repeal,
but its scope has never been systematically defined,
either by statute, case law or regulation.
Despite its uncertain scope, the repeal has fundamentally altered the taxation of business income. The
repeal was substantially completed with the 1986

Act, an act that also effected a systemic change in the
corporate tax regime, de-linking that regime from the
individual tax regime, marking the end of the partial
integration of the two regimes: Not only did the 1986
Act sound the death knell of the General Utilities
doctrine, it also eliminated an individual’s capital
gains preference and provided a higher maximum
tax rate for corporations than individuals.28 Of these
changes, only the General Utilities repeal tolerated
any administrative discretion.29
That discretion is far from unlimited. The repeal
cannot be implemented merely as an anti-abuse rule
or series of such rules because it defines a realization and recognition event for purposes of Code Sec.
1001.30 Thus, its application should not vary depending on the business purpose of a transaction.
In addition, although its outer boundaries may
be uncertain, the repeal, in the main, now seems
adequately defined both by the legislative history
for the 1986 Act that described the repeal and by
complimentary Code provisions enacted since the
repeal. At a minimum, it should generally apply if a
transaction otherwise eliminates a level of corporate
tax, whether through a distribution, sale or transfer
of an asset. That elimination may occur through the
elimination of gain or the creation of a noneconomic
loss.31 Further, the repeal arguably should also apply if a transaction duplicates an economic loss or
permits an “undue” deferral of corporate-level gain,
particularly if that gain is deferred and shifted to
another corporate taxpayer.32 The repeal should not
apply,
clearly
y, however, when a statutory provision
p
provides
for
gain
elimination,
and
elimination
prov
des fo
or ga
in
n el
mi ation, an
d tthat
hat el
h
mination is
consistent
policy
underlying
provision.
ons stent with the
he po
y un
der ying the prov
vision.33
That suggested scope is consistent with the legislative history to 1986 Act, but that legislative history
merely illustrated the repeal’s scope. The House Report noted that the General Utilities doctrine allowed
a corporation to distribute an appreciated asset to a
shareholder without gain, allowing the shareholder to
take a fair market value basis in the asset at the cost
of a shareholder-level tax.34 At a minimum, therefore,
the General Utilities repeal should require a corporation to recognize gain when it distributes appreciated
property to a shareholder and the shareholder takes
a fair market value basis in the asset.
Not only did the Senate fail to define the repeal’s
scope, it failed to follow the House in proposing the
repeal, but the proposal reappeared as a revenue
raiser in the Conference bill. The Conference Report
also failed to define the repeal’s scope, although it
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recognized that the repeal may be circumvented if
corporations were permitted to create artificial (or
noneconomic) losses.35 To combat that circumvention, Congress granted the Treasury broad regulatory
authority in Code Sec. 337(d) to prevent circumvention of the repeal, stating:
The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine is designed to require the corporate level recognition
of gain or a corporation’s sale or distribution of
appreciated property, irrespective of whether it
occurs in a liquidating or nonliquidating context.
The conferees expect the Secretary to issue, or to
amend, regulations to ensure that the purpose of
the new provisions is not circumvented through
the use of any other provision, including the
consolidated return regulations or the tax-free
reorganization provisions of the Code (part III of
Subchapter C).36
Thus, at least as an initial matter, Congress ceded
to the Treasury the difficult task of defining the repeal’s scope.

C. The Initial Administrative
spo
onsse
Response
Partially
arttially
i lly in
i resp
response,
po
the IRS issued Notice 87-14,37
which
anticipated
whiich anti
cipa
ate regulations
gulations that, among other
things,
would
target
transaction,
hin
ngs,
g wou
w
uld ta
arg
g the
e “son-of-mirrors”
ofs” transa
a transaction
traansaactio
on that
th
hat created
c ated noneconomic
ec
ic loss.
Example—Son-of-mirrors
transaction.38 P buys
l
all of the stock of T for
$1,000,
two
or $
000, aand
nd T has tw
o
assets, Wanted Asset and
Each
nd Unwanted
want d Asset.
Asset. Eac
h
asset has a $100 basis and $500 value. T distributes Wanted Asset to P, recognizing a $400 gain,39
which is deferred under the intercompany transaction rules.40 P accounts for the distribution by
reducing its T stock basis by $500, from $1,000 to
$50041 but including no amount in gross income
because of the distribution.42
P sells the T stock to X for $500, its fair market
value. Immediately before the sale, T takes its
deferred $400 gain on Wanted Asset into account.43 Consequently, P increases its T stock
basis by $400 to account for that gain, from
$500 to $900.44 Thus, on P’s sale of the T stock, P
recognizes a $400 loss, the excess of P’s T stock
basis ($900) over its amount realized ($500).45 If
P’s stock loss offset T’s gain on Wanted Asset (or

other P group income), the group would eliminate
corporate-level gain without tax, contrary to the
General Utilities repeal. Notice 87-14 eliminated
that noneconomic loss.46
Notice 87-14 attacked a clear target of the General
Utilities repeal—the elimination of corporate-level
tax. That elimination could occur directly (through
the elimination of corporate gain) or indirectly
(through the creation of noneconomic corporate
loss). As Notice 87-14 illustrates, the General Utilities repeal targets either direct or indirect elimination
transactions, whether they involve liquidating or
nonliquidating distributions, sales or other transfers
of assets.

D. The 1987 Legislation
When the repeal was enacted, it was unclear whether
it applied to a “mirror” transaction. In this transaction
(and the cousin-of-mirrors transaction), a consolidated group (or nonconsolidated, affiliated group in the
cousin-of-mirrors transaction) could dispose of appreciated target assets without gain. Through a series
of steps, the group would transfer appreciated target
assets to a subsidiary and then sell the subsidiary
stock at no gain (and sometimes at a loss). Although
these transactions could preserve all of the built-in
gain in the target assets at the corporate level, that
gain was deferred and shifted to a new corporation
or consolidated group. Legislation enacted in 1987
hampered that deferral and shift.47
Ex mp e—M
Example—Mirror
— irror tra
transaction.
sact on Th
The
e P gro
group
oup pla
plans
ns
buy
all stoc
stock
T, which
owns
businesses,
to bu
b
y al
k of T
hich ow
ns ttwo
wo bu
sinesses,
Business U, with a $30 basis and $100 value and
Business W, with a $40 basis and $100 value. The
acquiring group intends to keep Business W but
dispose of Business U.
The group forms two acquisition subsidiaries,
S1 and S2, funding each with $100 and taking
a $100 basis in the stock of each subsidiary.
Each subsidiary acquires one-half of the T stock.
Shortly after the purchase, T liquidates, with
S1 acquiring the Business U assets and S2 the
Business W assets. For purposes of Code Sec.
332(b)(1), each P group member is treated as
owning any stock owned by another member.48
Thus, S1 and S2 are each treated as owning all
T stock; Code Sec. 332 applies to their receipt
of liquidating distributions from T, and neither
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recognizes any gain or loss on the liquidation.
Further, under the law in effect before 1987, Code
Sec. 337 arguably also applied to T on its liquidation. Assuming that it applied, T recognized no
gain (or loss) on its distributions to S1 and S2.
P then sells the S1 stock to X for $100, recognizing no gain or loss. Note that if T had sold
Business U assets directly to X, it would have
recognized a $70 gain. This “mirror” transaction
deferred that gain recognition, although at a cost
of the Business U assets retaining a $30 basis.
Despite language in the legislative history that
supported immediate recognition absent a regulatory change, some believed that gain deferral
occasioned by a mirror transaction was properly
allowed following the 1986 Act’s repeal of the
General Utilities doctrine. 49 This dispute was
enlivened by a debate that played out in the Congressional Record between Democratic House
and Republican Senate members. Representative
Rostenkowski asserted that gain could not be
deferred in a mirror transaction “merely because
the underlying assets of the subsidiary do not
obtain
stepped-up
basis.”50 Senators Dole and
ain a st
tep
Packwood
asserting that the General
acckwo
k ood
d disagreed,
di ag
dis
Utilities
did not
affect the tre
treatment
of mirUtilitiees repeal
repeal d
ot affec
atment o
ror
or transactions.
tran
nsacction
ns.51
Although
A
Altho
ugh Rostenkowski
Rosstenk wski may have lost
lo t that skirmish,
sk
Dole
Packwood
because iin 1987,
lle and
an
nd P
Pack
k oo lost
st the war
ar be
Congress acted to definitively shut down the mirror
transaction.52 Although the
he House
use report
rep
port justifi
justified
ed thee
legislative change to prevent
deferral,
the
Conven gain
ain d
eferral th
eC
o ference Report described the change without offering
a rationale.53 Nevertheless, the change certainly
limited gain deferral, consistent with a companion
piece that targeted a transaction that exploited Code
Sec. 304 to defer or eliminate gain.
Example—Cousin-of-mirrors transaction.54 P
owned all stock of S1 and S2, and S1 owned all
stock of S3 with a $20 basis. S1 sold the S3 stock
to S2 for $100, its fair market value. If this sale occurred immediately after the effective date of the
1986 Act, Code Sec. 304 applied to the sale and
S1 might recognize no net income on the sale.
Code Sec. 304(a)(1) applied, for example, if a
person transferred the stock of one controlled
corporation to another corporation and received

property in exchange.55 For this purpose, a person
controlled a corporation if it owned, actually
and constructively, at least 50 percent, by vote
or value, of the corporation’s stock.56 Code Sec.
304(a)(1) applied to S1’s sale of the S3 stock because S1, a person, not only controlled S3 before
the sale, actually owning all S3 stock, but also
controlled S2 after the sale, constructively owning
all of its stock.57
When Code Sec. 304(a)(1) applied, the acquiring corporation (i.e., S2) was treated as making
a distribution in redemption of its stock, but the
character of the redemption under Code Sec.
302(b) was determined by looking to the stock
of the target corporation (i.e., S3).58 Because S1
owned, actually and constructively, all S3 stock
before and after the transaction,59 the deemed
redemption was not described in Code Sec.
302(b) and must have been one to which Code
Sec. 302(d) and Code Sec. 301 applied.60
Assume that S2 had at least $100 of current
earnings and profits, and S1 treated the full $100
payment as a dividend. It therefore included none
of that $100 amount in gross income.61 Further,
because S1 owned no S2 stock, it could not
reduce any basis in the S2 stock because of the
deemed redemption.62 However, S1 increased
its earnings and profits by $80 (i.e., the $100
dividend amount minus its $20 basis in the relinquished
S3 stock), resulting in an $80 increase
q
in P’s
P S1 stock basis.
basis 63
S2 recognized no gain or loss when it acquired
the S3 stock, treating the acquisition as a contribution to its capital.64 However, S2 reduced its
earnings and profits by up to $100. As a result, P’s
basis in its S2 stock was up to $100 lower because
of the Code Sec. 304 transaction.65
Thus, the transaction increased P’s basis in its S1
stock by $80, at a cost of reducing its basis in
its S2 stock by up to $100, eliminating gain or
creating loss in that S1 stock while creating gain
or eliminating loss in the S2 stock. Although P
could later sell S1 stock at a reduced gain (or
increased loss), the transaction might merely
defer, rather than eliminate, gain within the
corporate system because of P’s basis adjustment to the S2 stock.66
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Thus, the 1987 legislative change attacked gain
deferral rather than gain elimination, and that attack should be considered an aspect of the General
Utilities repeal. Note that even though the repeal is
identified with the 1986 Act, it is imprecise to say
that the act implements the General Utilities repeal.
The statutory repeal actually began in 1969 and was
implemented in stages over many years, including
in 1987.
The 1987 legislative change is also consistent with
and furthers the repeal, complementing an earlier attack on the deferral and shifting of corporate gain.67
In 1984, Congress repealed part of the General
Utilities doctrine when it amended Code Sec. 311 to
require a corporation generally to recognize gain on
its distribution of appreciated property to a corporate
shareholder.68 Before the amendment, the distributing
corporation recognized no gain, but the corporate
shareholder took the property with a carryover basis, preserving the gain. Congress made the change
because it found the shift in gain and attendant tax
liability “inappropriate,” noting that the distribution
may allow the gain’s character to change.69 Because
the character, and therefore the amount, of tax
could change through the shift, Congress rejected
“surrogate”
even though no gain escaped a
rogaate” taxation
tax
70
corporate-level
orp
poraate-le
levell ttax.
Finally,
Fi
nally,
y the
the 1987
19
987 legislative
slative change
hange is
i better viewed
v
ass merely
the
a
mere
m elyy clarifying
c ify
clari
y
h 1986
6 Act, not
ot adopting
adop
new
ew
w rule.
rulle.71 Thus,
Thu
us, lim
limitations
ations o
on
n gain deferral
eferral sshould
be cons
considered
General
Utilities
sid
iderred
d part
rtt of the Ge
ral Ut
lit repeal.

E. Other Statutory
y Provisions
ovisio s
Other statutory provisions
ns also
a implement
implement aspects off
the repeal. Among other things, those provisions attack the selective recognition of loss, the duplication
of one economic loss, surrogate taxation and gain
deferral, while sometimes forgoing policy purity for
a more administrable rule.

1. 1986 and Prior Changes
For example, Congress appeared to attack the selective recognition of loss when it amended Code Sec.
311 to require a corporation to recognize gain but not
loss on its distribution of property. Without this rule,
a corporation might “cherry pick” losses, choosing to
recognize loss by distributing loss property, but defer
gain by retaining gain property.72 That concern may
also have motivated Code Sec. 336(d)(3) (providing
that a corporation recognizes no loss on its distribution of loss property to a minority shareholder as

part of a Code Sec. 332 liquidation)73 and Code Sec.
337(b)(1) (providing that a liquidating corporation
recognizes neither gain nor loss when it satisfies a
debt to the controlling parent as part of a Code Sec.
332 liquidation).74 The legislative history, however,
does little to describe the rationale for these changes.
In amending Code Sec. 311, Congress may also
have had the following concern: If loss could be
recognized on a distribution, a corporation and controlling shareholder may be tempted to undervalue
distributed property, producing phantom losses
at the corporate level and understating dividend
income at the shareholder level, income that later
may be converted to more favorably taxed capital
gain. Although Code Sec. 311’s loss-disallowance
rule still tolerates the undervaluation, it eases the
concern. It also makes it more likely that the chronically underfunded IRS will have to deal with only
one taxpayer, the shareholder, to address any possible undervaluation.
In the 1986 Act, Congress also added Code Sec.
336(d)(1) and (2), provisions that target the creation of
duplicate loss at the shareholder and corporate levels
and also serve as a substitute for applying Code Sec.
267 to liquidations.75 Under Code Sec. 336(d)(1), a
liquidating corporation cannot recognize a loss on
a property distribution to a “related person”76 if the
distribution is not pro rata or if the distributed property is “disqualified property.”77 A “related person,”
defined by reference to Code Sec. 267, includes an
individual who owns, actually and constructively, at
least 50 percent (by value) of the corporation’s
stock.78
p
“Disqualifi
Disqua fied
ed property”
property is property
property acquired
acqu red by the
th
liquidating
corporation
transaction
which
quidating cor
porat
in a tr
ansa tion to w
hic
Code Sec. 351 applied (or as a capital contribution)
within five years of the distribution date.79
Like Code Sec. 336(d)(1), Code Sec. 336(d)(2)
restricts a liquidating corporation’s loss and is also
an “anti-stuffing” rule aimed at preventing double
deductions.80 The rule is triggered by a distribution,
sale or exchange of property that had been acquired
in a Code Sec. 351 transaction (or as a contribution
to capital) if the following additional condition is
met: The property’s acquisition was “part of a plan a
principal purpose of which was to recognize loss by
the liquidating corporation with respect to such property in connection with the liquidation.”81 Property
acquired by the liquidating corporation “after the date
two years before the date a corporation adopts a plan
of liquidation” is presumed to have been acquired
with that principal purpose.82
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Although Code Sec. 336(d) offers relatively modest
clues about the scope of the General Utilities repeal,
Code Sec. 1374 yields a richer vein to mine. It suggests that Congress was concerned with not only
the possible elimination of corporate tax but also its
deferral and that it was willing to sacrifice absolute
precision for administrability.
Code Sec. 1374 applies when a C corporation
converts to an S corporation. As the intuitive response
to the conversion, the corporation could have been
treated as constructively liquidating, with the corporation and its shareholders recognizing gain or
loss on the conversion,83 but Code Sec. 1374 takes
a different tack: If the S corporation recognizes preconversion built-in gain during the recognition period
(i.e., generally the 10 years following the conversion),
that gain is subject to a corporate-level tax. Thus,
unlike the more intuitive approach, Code Sec. 1374
defers the tax on pre-conversion built-in gain, imposing tax when the gain otherwise would have been
recognized absent the conversion. This approach
affords taxpayers the benefit of deferral, an integral
aspect of this portion of the General Utilities repeal.
It is not clear, however, why the built-in gain is
tracked only for 10 years, although that approach
may
justifi
y be
e ju
stified for up to three reasons. First, it
makes
Code
Sec. 1374 more administrable. Secak
k Cod
kes
C
d
de SSe
ond,
ond
nd
d if gain
d,
n was
was deferred
rred for
fo more than
han 10 years,
Congress
such
deferral
Con
ngre
g ess may
m y have
ha believed
e
s
ferral was
w the
substantial
ub
bstan
ntial equivalent
equ
uivale t of nonrecognition.
non ecogni on. Following
Foll
thatt reasoning,
iff a corporation
in
reaason
ning,
i
porati engages
enga
i a transaction that
h defers gain for more than 10 years, that
transaction could be viewed
ewe as the
the equivalent
equivalent of
o a
gain-elimination transaction.
ctio Finally,
inally, Congress
Congress may
m y
have been concerned that Code Sec. 1374 treated
the corporation and shareholder too harshly in the
following way: A C corporation’s taxable income
is taxed when earned to the corporation, but taxed
to the shareholder only on distribution. If Code
Sec. 1374 applies to an S corporation’s income,
however, it is subject to a corporate and immediate
shareholder tax. Thus, the S corporation shareholder
loses the benefit of deferral, and Congress may have
incorporated a 10-year rule, at least in part, to balance the loss of that benefit.
Whatever the relevant reasons, when Congress adopted Code Sec. 1374, it took into account deferral
while trying to craft an administrable rule. Consistently, rules implementing the General Utilities repeal
should consider deferral and administrability, not just
gain elimination and loss creation.

2. Other Complimentary Changes
Congress has made other statutory changes that
compliment the General Utilities repeal, including
under Code Secs. 355(d), 358(h), 362(e) and 1059.
Those changes target loss duplication, gain deferral
and gain elimination.
Code Sec. 355(d) targets gain elimination.84 Under
that provision, a distributing corporation recognizes gain on its distribution of appreciated stock
in a distribution otherwise qualifying for nonrecognition under Code Sec. 355 if one person holds
“disqualified” stock that constitutes 50 percent or
more (by vote or value) of the stock of the distributing or controlled corporation immediately after the
distribution.85 Congress concluded not only that
nonrecognition by those distributing corporations
was inconsistent with the General Utilities repeal
(because the distributions “resemble[d] sales”) but
also, more fundamentally, that the repeal properly
could apply to stock distributions.86
Code Secs. 358(h) and 362(e) attack loss duplication.87 Code Sec. 358(h) may apply, for example, if,
in a Code Sec. 351 exchange, (i) one corporation
(“P”) transfers property with a fair market value basis
to a wholly owned corporation (“S”) in exchange for
S nonvoting preferred stock described in Code Sec.
1504(a)(4), (ii) S assumes P’s deductible liability, and
(iii) P would otherwise take a basis in the S stock received in the exchange exceeding its value (because
of the liability assumption).88 Under Code Sec. 358(h)
(1), the transferor (e.g., P) generally must reduce its
basis in the stock received (but not below value) by
the
the
he aamount
mount of th
he aassumed
ssumed deductible
deduc b e liability.
liabi ity.
Code
358(h)
apply
and
If Co
C
de Sec. 358
( did not ap
p y an
d P and S
joined in filing consolidated returns, some argued
that P could sell the S preferred stock, recognizing a
loss, and S could enjoy a corresponding deduction
when it then paid the deductible liability, thereby
duplicating the loss.89 Code Sec. 358(h) eliminates
that duplicate loss.
Code Sec. 362(e)(2) also eliminates loss duplication when a shareholder transfers property with a
net built-in loss to a corporation in a Code Sec. 351
exchange.90 That built-in loss is eliminated at the corporate level or, by election, at the shareholder level.91
Thus, the effect of Code Sec. 362(e)(2) is to preserve
the net built-in loss at the shareholder or corporate
level, but not at both.
Finally, Code Sec. 1059 targets the creation of a
noneconomic loss. Under that section, if a corporate
shareholder receives an “extraordinary dividend” on
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any share of stock92 and the shareholder has not held
the stock for more than two years on the dividend
announcement date, the shareholder must reduce
its basis in that stock by the nontaxed portion of
the dividend (i.e., generally the dividends received
deduction).93 If the reduction exceeds basis, the
shareholder treats the excess as gain from the sale
or exchange of stock.94
Consider the following example:
Example—Extraordinary dividends. P acquires
all T stock for $10,000,000. Assume that P and
T do not join in filing a consolidated return, that
P pays tax at a 35-percent rate and that T has at
least $4,000,000 of earnings and profits. Shortly
after the purchase, T distributes $4,000,000 to P.
P qualifies for an 80-percent dividends-received
deduction because it owns all T stock.95 Thus, P
includes $800,000 of the dividend in its gross
income (20 percent of $4,000,000) and incurs a
$280,000 tax (35 percent of $800,000).
Because of the distribution, T’s value declines
to $6,000,000, and P quickly sells the T stock
for that amount. Absent Code Sec. 1059, P recognizes
$4,000,000 loss ($10,000,000 basis
gniz
zes a $4
less
leess $6,000,000
$6,00
6 00
00 0
00,0
00 amount realized). If P can fully
utilize
uttilizee that
tha
at loss,
lo
oss it will enjoy
enj y a $1,400,000
$1 400,000 tax
benefi
beenefi
fit from
from the loss.
s. Overall,
al therefore,
efore, P will
enjoy
owneren
njoyy a $1,120,000
$ 20,0 tax benefi
$1,12
benefit from
from its ow
9
96
ship
hip of
h
hi
of T,
T ev
even th
tthough
h it ssuffered
ered n
no nett nontax
economic
i loss.97
Troubled by that potential
ntia benefi
enefit,
t, Congre
Congress
ess een-acted Code Sec. 1059. If Code Sec. 1059 applied to
the dividend that P received in the example above, P
would reduce its basis in the T stock by $3,200,000
(the nontaxed portion of the dividend)98 and would
recognize only an $800,000 tax loss on the sale
($6,800,000 basis minus $6,000,000 amount realized). Overall, then, P would have a $0 net tax loss
($800,000 taxable dividend minus $800,000 sales
loss), matching its economic loss.
In summary, if P acquired the T stock and Code Sec.
1059 did not apply, P would enjoy a noneconomic
loss. Code Sec. 1059 may be justified to prevent
that noneconomic loss, particularly when P buys the
stock from an individual. If P buys the stock from a
corporation, Code Sec. 1059’s justification is more
nuanced because its application could result in duplicate corporate-level gain. However, the section’s

application in that case may be justified for the following reason: Not only would it be difficult to craft
and administer a rule that excepted that case, but it
seems likely that, in the absence of Code Sec. 1059,
the tax benefit of P’s loss would exceed the tax cost
of the seller’s gain (e.g., because the seller had available losses to offset the gain).99 Overall, then, the
transaction would reduce corporate tax, justifying
the application of Code Sec. 1059.100

III. Implementing the Repeal
At a minimum, the General Utilities repeal should
be implemented to prevent a corporation from eliminating corporate-level gain without tax, unless that
elimination is specifically allowed under a Code section and consistent with that section’s purpose.101 A
regulation under Code Sec. 337(d) should be added
providing that general rule.
That regulation cannot be the sole means to
implement the repeal, however. In at least some
circumstances, technical rules are necessary to
implement the repeal, particularly in applying the
consolidated return regulations and in coordinating
Subchapters C and K. For example, a consolidated
group could readily avoid the repeal absent a rule like
the unified loss rule of Reg. §1.1502-36, although that
rule in certain important respects should be modified and simplified. Further, corporations could also
use partnerships to circumvent the repeal, even with
Code Secs. 704(c), 732(f) and 737, among other partnership rules, and the Treasury should finalize Reg.
§1.337(d)-3,
modifi
of
1.337(d -3, with
with m
od cations,
cat ons to aaddress
ddreess ssome
ome o
those
Finally,
may
be
necessary
Conhose cconcerns.
oncerns. Fin
al itt m
ay b
en
ecessary ffor
or C
Con
gress to modify Code Sec. 362(e)(2) to prevent loss
duplication with reorganizations under Code Sec.
368(a)(1)(B). This section describes those concerns.

A. A Possible General Rule
First, the Treasury should craft a regulation under
Code Sec. 337(d) providing, as a general rule, that
a corporation cannot eliminate corporate-level gain
without tax, unless that elimination is specifically
allowed under a Code section and consistent with
that section’s purpose.102 Although some may argue
that Code Sec. 337(d) should be implemented only
by specific rules (e.g., Reg. §1.1502-36), the better approach is that those specific rules should be
supplemented by a general rule.
There is some force, however, behind arguments
to forego the suggested general rule or, in fact, any
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general rule. First, the suggested general rule would
attack holes in the Code and regulations, an attack
arguably better left to Congress. More broadly, the
legislative history does not explicitly call for a general rule. Finally, any general rule arguably should
be implemented only following explicit Congressional approval because the General Utilities repeal
has been implemented using only specific rules for
over 26 years.
Despite the force of those arguments, the better
view supports implementing the suggested general
rule. First, the rule is consistent with the repeal,
and the statute and legislative history both support
adopting a broad rule. Consistent with the repeal, a
corporation’s economic income should be included
in gross income, unless an exception to the inclusion clearly applies. 103 Second, narrower, more
specific rules provide incentives for tax-avoidance
transactions that skirt those rules. Those transactions
create deadweight costs and may provide greater
benefits to the more sophisticated (i.e., those more
likely to exploit the avoidance transactions). 104
Finally, the typical Congressional response to taxavoidance transactions complicates the Code; the
suggested general rule avoids at least some of that
complexity.
to avoid that complexity, limit
mple
exity
y. Thus,
T
incentives
tax-avoidance transactions and furceentiv
ives for
f ta
ther
herr thee repeal,
rep
peal,
l the
t suggested
uggested general
gene al rule should
s
be implemented.
imp
plemente
ed.
The
Th
he rule
r e may
maay be
b illustrated
illustra ed by the
he following
foll
examples:
amples:
l
Example—Applying Code
Cod Sec. 1031
1031 and
d the
the
reorganization provisions
ion to
o eliminate
elimina e gain.
gain. P
acquires T assets in a Code Sec. 368 reorganization. In the reorganization, T transfers all of its
assets to P in exchange (or deemed exchange)
for P stock plus land with a $35,000 basis and
$60,000 value. Among other assets, T transfers
land with a $50,000 basis and $60,000 value.
T distributes (or is deemed to distribute) the P
stock and land it receives in the reorganization
to its shareholders.
For its transfer of land, P will receive property
worth $60,000. Under Code Sec. 1001(a), it will
have a $25,000 realized gain (the excess of the
$60,000 amount realized over the $35,000 basis).
Under Code Sec. 1001(c), P will recognize that
gain, unless another section of the Code prevents
its recognition.

Code Sec. 1031 may prevent the gain recognition because P will receive land from T in the
exchange. If P held the land exchanged for use
in a trade or business or for investment and will
hold the land received from T for either of those
purposes, P should be treated as exchanging its
land for T’s land, that exchange should be a Code
Sec. 1031 exchange, and P should not recognize
its realized $25,000 gain on the exchange.105
T may also be considered to exchange land for
$60,000 worth of land. Because T’s land has a
$50,000 basis, T will realize a $10,000 gain on
the exchange ($60,000 amount realized less
$50,000 basis).106 T’s exchange cannot be described in Code Sec. 1031, however, because
T will not hold the land it receives for a qualifying purpose.107 Instead, as part of the plan of
reorganization, it will transfer the land to its
shareholders. Consequently, T will recognize its
realized $10,000 gain, unless another Code section prevents its recognition.
Because the exchange is part of a reorganization, T will not recognize the realized gain on
the exchange. Under Code Sec. 361(b)(1)(A), a
party to a reorganization does not recognize gain
when it receives boot in the reorganization if it
distributes that boot to its shareholders as part
of the plan of reorganization.108 Because T will
be a party to a reorganization and will distribute
the land to its shareholders as part of the plan of
reorganization,
reor anization
n, it will
w recognize
recognize no gain on its
receipt
rece pt of
of that
tha land
land from
m P.
P
T may recognize any gain, however, on its distribution of the land to its shareholders. A target
recognizes gain (but not loss) on its distribution
of nonqualifying property to its shareholders as if
it sold that property for fair market value consideration.109 Nonqualifying property is all property
other than, generally, stock or stock rights in (or
obligations of) the target or another party to the
reorganization.110 Thus, the land that T receives
from P is nonqualifying property, and T will recognize gain on its distribution to the extent the
land’s value exceeds its basis.
Because T will take a fair market value basis in
the land under Code Sec. 358(a)(2), T does not
recognize gain on the distribution (assuming that
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the land is distributed immediately following
its receipt). Code Sec. 358 applies to a party to
a reorganization that transfers assets in a Code
Sec. 361 exchange in whole or in part for stock
or securities of another party to the reorganization.111 Under that section, the target takes a
substituted basis in acquiror stock received in the
reorganization, but takes a fair market value basis
in any boot received.112 Accordingly, T will take a
fair market value basis in the land received from
P and will recognize no gain when it distributes
the land to its shareholders, and, surprisingly, T’s
$10,000 inherent gain on its land is eliminated
in the reorganization.
Because corporate-level gain is eliminated and not
deferred (violating the policies behind both Code
Sec. 361 and Code Sec. 1031), the proposed regulatory provision should apply. However, there are two
possible candidates for its application. Either T could
recognize its realized $10,000 gain on the land it
surrenders in the exchange, or P could recognize its
realized $25,000 gain on the land it surrenders in the
exchange. The better recognition candidate is T, not
P. P’s exchange is consistent with the policy behind
Codee Se
Sec.
1031 because P would take a basis in the
ec. 1
103
land
preserves its builtnd
d received
recceive
i ed
d in
in the
t exchange
g that p
in
n gain.
gain
g . In contrast,
contra T’ss transfer
transfer of the
th land violates
v
the
behind
companion
he policy
p icyy behi
poli
b
nd Code
de Sec. 361
6 and its
ts comp
provision
rovvisio
on Code
C e Sec.
Sec 362(b)
62(b) because
because T’s gain would
nott be
b preserved
preserve in P’s basis in the transferred
tr f
d land,
violating the
h inherent principle upon which those sections rest—that any of the transferor’s
tra feror’s realized
real zed but not
not
recognized gain or loss is preserved
pre ved in
i the transferee’s
transfereee s
hands.113 Thus, T should recognize its $10,000 gain.
Example—Duplicating loss in a reorganization.
Variation 1. Assume that S1 transfers its assets
to X in a reorganization described in Code Sec.
368(a)(1)(C) (a C reorganization). In the reorganization, X acquires all S1 assets in exchange
for $900 of its voting stock and GainCo stock
with a $60 basis and $100 value. S1 liquidates,
distributing the X voting stock to P solely in
exchange for its S1 stock and transferring the
GainCo stock to its sole creditor in full satisfaction of its debt to that creditor.114
S1 and X, but not P, are parties to the reorganization.115 S1 recognizes no gain or loss
on its transfer of property to X, even though

it receives boot (i.e., the GainCo stock) in
exchange, because it “distributes” that boot
pursuant to the plan of reorganization.116 S1
recognizes no gain or loss on its distribution
of the X stock to P because the X stock is
qualified property.117 Assuming that S1 transfers
the GainCo stock to its creditor just after it
received it, S1 also recognizes no gain or loss
on that transfer because it takes a basis in that
stock equal to its value.118
X recognizes no gain or loss to the extent it
acquires S1 property for its stock.119 However, it
recognizes its realized $40 gain on its exchange
of the GainCo stock for $100 of S1 assets.120 Because S1 recognizes no gain on the transfer of
its assets to X, X also succeeds to S1’s adjusted
bases in the transferred S1 assets.121
Variation 2. The facts are the same as in variation 1, except that S1 holds one share of P stock,
which it transfers to X in the reorganization. The
results are the same, although the analysis apparently differs.
For the same reasons noted in variation 1, S1
recognizes no gain or loss on its transfer of
property to X, and it recognizes no gain or loss
on its distribution of the X stock to P. Further, X
recognizes no gain or loss to the extent it acquires
S1 assets for X stock, but it recognizes a $40 gain
on its exchange of the GainCo stock for $100 of
S1 aassets.
sets. X also
also succeeds
suc eds to S1’s
S1 s adjusted basis
in tthe
hee transferred
transferred S1
S assets.
set .
S1 also recognizes no gain or loss on its transfer
of the GainCo stock to its creditor, assuming that
it transfers the stock to its creditor just after it received it, although the analysis seems to change.
S1 apparently determines its basis in that stock
under Code Sec. 362(b), not Code Sec. 358(a)
(2), because of the priority rule in Code Sec.
358(e). In relevant part, Code Sec. 358(e) states
that Code Sec. 358 does not apply to a corporation if it transfers stock of its controlling parent,
in whole or in part, for the property received in
the exchange. Because S1 exchanged P stock
for a portion of the X assets and P controlled S1
(owning all of its stock),122 S1 apparently does not
determine its basis in the X assets received under
Code Sec. 358.
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Instead, S1 apparently determines its basis in
those assets under Code Sec. 362(b).123 Under
that section, S1’s basis in an X asset will equal
X’s basis, increased by any gain X recognized
on the transfer of that asset. Thus, because X
recognized a $40 gain on its transfer of the
GainCo stock, S1’s basis in the stock is $100,
and S1 recognizes no gain or loss on its transfer
of that stock to its creditor.124
Variation 3. The facts are the same as in variation 2, except that instead of transferring GainCo
stock, X transfers LossCo stock, with a $1,000
basis and $100 basis. The analysis and results
are the same as in Variation 2, except as follows:
First, X recognizes a $900 loss on its use of LossCo
stock.125 Second, S1 takes a $1,000 basis, rather
than a fair market value basis, in the LossCo
stock. Under Code Sec. 362(b), the acquiring
corporation’s basis in assets is adjusted for gain,
but not loss, recognized by the transferor. When
S1 transfers the LossCo stock to its creditor in
satisfaction of its debt, S1 also apparently recognizes a $900 loss ($1,000 basis minus $100
debt
ed).126 Thus, the same loss provides two
bt satisfi
ssatisfied
corporate-level
co
orpo
oratee-lev
l ve benefits.
The
duplicated
example
Th
he dup
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natee corporate-level
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gain inconsistent
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he General
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eal FFurther,
th tthe basis carryover is inconsistent with the p
purpose of
Code Sec. 362(b) merelyy to
t defer realized
reealizeed but not
not
recognized gain or loss.. Th
Thus,, the prop
proposed
reguposed
d re
g latory provision should apply by requiring S1 to
take a $100 basis in the LossCo stock under Code
Sec. 1012, preventing the duplication of loss and
a circumvention of the repeal.127
Example—Duplicating recognized loss through a
B reorganization. P acquires all of the X stock in
exchange for its voting stock in a reorganization
described in Code Sec. 368(a)(1)(B) (a B reorganization). Assume that X has one shareholder,
Fred, and his basis in the X stock was $100, but
its value was only $10. Also assume that the P
stock is nonqualified preferred stock described
in Code Sec. 351(g).
Because the P stock is nonqualified preferred
stock, neither Code Sec. 354 nor Code Sec. 356

applies to Fred’s exchange because Fred receives
no qualified property in the exchange.128 Thus,
under Code Sec. 1001, Fred recognizes a $90
loss.129 Under Code Sec. 362(b), however, P succeeds to Fred’s $100 basis in the X stock because
Code Sec. 362(b) does not require the corporate
transferee to reduce basis for any loss recognized
by the transferor on the exchange.
For the same reasons noted in connection with the
preceding example, the proposed regulatory rule
should apply. The transaction creates a duplicated,
loss that may eliminate corporate-level gain, so that
a basis carryover under Code Sec. 362(b) would be
inconsistent with that provision’s purpose merely to
defer realized but not recognized gain or loss. Thus,
P should take a $10 basis in the X stock under Code
Sec. 1012, preventing the duplication of loss.130

B. The Dual Nature of
Subsidiary Stock
The dual nature of subsidiary stock presents a significant challenge in implementing the General Utilities
repeal because subsidiary stock is treated sometimes
as a separate asset and sometimes as an indirect
interest in the subsidiary’s assets. For example, if a
parent corporation sells subsidiary stock, it generally
treats the stock as a separate asset and recognizes
any realized gain or loss.131 If, however, the parent
owns an affiliated interest in subsidiary stock and the
subsidiary liquidates in a Code Sec. 332 liquidation,
the parent recognizes no gain or loss on the liquida3
tion.
on 132
FFurther,
u the , if th
the
e parent
rent an
and
d ssubsidiary
ubsid ary jo
join
n in
fi
ling cconsolidated
they
combine
and
filing
ons lidated rreturns,
et s, th
ey ccom
b ne income
ncome an
loss, with an effect in some ways like a liquidation.
In either case, the parent’s subsidiary stock is closely
tied to the subsidiary’s assets.
Thus, if the parent has a loss in affiliated subsidiary
stock, it may sell that stock, recognizing the loss. If,
instead, it has a gain in that stock, it may engage
in a liquidation (or quasi-liquidation) transaction,
avoiding that gain. That choice raises the specter of
selective loss recognition and gain deferral, posing a
real conundrum in implementing the repeal because
in important ways Congress seems to tolerate that
choice despite the repeal.
Congress certainly has embraced that a parent generally recognizes gain or loss on its sale of subsidiary
stock (and gain on its distribution of that stock).133 In
fact, that sale or distribution may result in a triple
tax, although the potential for multiple taxation is a

TAXES—THE TAX MAGAZINE®
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2304374

245

The Scope of the General Utilities Repeal
longstanding aspect of the corporate tax system, not
something created by the General Utilities repeal.134
Further, if a parent owns an affiliated interest in a
subsidiary, it may liquidate that subsidiary without
recognizing gain or loss, assuming that the liquidation
is described in Code Sec. 332(b).135 The subsidiary
also recognizes no gain or loss on its distributions to
the parent (Code Sec. 337(a)), but the parent takes
transferred bases in the distributed subsidiary assets
(Code Sec. 334(b)(1)) and also succeeds to important
tax attributes of the subsidiary (Code Sec. 381(a)).
Thus, the parent steps into the subsidiary’s shoes,
and the parent and subsidiary are treated like one
economic unit.
That treatment makes innate sense when the parent has formed the subsidiary and has always owned
all subsidiary stock. Then, if the parent receives
dividends from the subsidiary, the parent has no net
taxable income.136 If the subsidiary liquidates when
the parent’s subsidiary stock has appreciated in
value, that appreciation represents existing or future
earnings that could be distributed (when earned)
without tax, justifying the elimination of the parent’s
built-in gain in subsidiary stock. Stated differently,
the parent and subsidiary can readily be treated as
one economic
eco
onomic unit, supporting the elimination of
that
att built-in
b iilt-in
bui
il in gain.
gaiin
i
The
case
less
compelling,
Th
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ase is
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ss sstraightforward,
htforwa d, but sstill
ll comp
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following
longtime IRS
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position,
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lleegisl
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stor and
d historic
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di
theory. Since
at least 1975, the IRS has concluded
Si
that Code Sec. 332 could
d apply
a y to a subsidiary’s
subsidia y s liqiq
uidation if a parent owned
ed a minority
inori y interest
in e es in the
subsidiary, but then purchased enough subsidiary stock
to create affiliation before the subsidiary adopted a
plan of liquidation.137 Congress appeared to not only
tolerate but implicitly endorse this result as part of the
General Utilities repeal. In describing a Code Sec. 332
liquidation, it looked to affiliation, however formed,
as the touchstone.138 Further, it expanded the potential
reach of Code Sec. 338(h)(10), granting the Treasury
regulatory authority to allow a Code Sec. 338(h)(10)
election for an affiliated, nonconsolidated target.139
Under that type of election, the parent recognized no
gain or loss on its target stock, whenever acquired,
because the target was deemed to liquidate under
Code Sec. 332.140 Thus, following the repeal, Congress
believed that in a subsidiary liquidation described in
Code Sec. 332, the parent recognized no gain or loss,
no matter when it had acquired the subsidiary stock.

That nonrecognition is also consistent with historic
dividend theory. Until 1936, corporations enjoyed
a 100-percent DRD for all dividends, but the DRD
was reduced to 85 percent in 1936, when Congress
introduced graduated rates, rates that mostly benefitted smaller corporations.141 It rationalized graduated
rates because “[t]he advantages and protections conferred on corporations by Government increase[d] in
value as the size of the corporation increase[d].”142
Whatever their merit, graduated rates raised the following concern: A person might avoid tax by forming
numerous subsidiaries to benefit from multiple sets of
graduated rates.143 Ostensibly to address that concern,
Congress reduced the DRD for corporate shareholders from 100 to 85 percent.144 Thus, historically, the
DRD was reduced to accommodate graduated rates,
and absent graduated rates, the DRD should be 100
percent, regardless of the corporate shareholder’s percentage interest in the subsidiary, since a 100-percent
DRD helps avoid multiple corporate tax on the same
economic income.
In summary, in a Code Sec. 332 liquidation, the
parent’s gain in subsidiary stock represents existing
or future earnings, no matter when that stock was
acquired, and historically those earnings could be
distributed without tax. Code Sec. 332, which views
the parent and subsidiary as an economic unit, follows that historic approach.
A reduced DRD may be justified, however, to make
it more costly for a corporation to do the following:
acquire an interest in stock pregnant with a dividend,
receive the dividend and then promptly sell that stock
att a n
noneconomic
loss.
oneconom c lo
oss 145 No
Nonetheless,
nethel s , it seems
eem
ms clear
lea
that
hat the
he corporation
corporation recognizes
ogn zes a loss
o s on
on the
the stock
stoc
sale. In addition, an affiliated parent may recognize
loss on both a stock sale and subsequent liquidation
when the parent sells enough subsidiary stock to
break affiliation and the subsidiary then liquidates,146
a result sanctioned by Granite Trust.147
In Granite Trust, a parent sold enough subsidiary
stock to assure that the subsidiary’s later liquidation
would not be described in the predecessor to Code
Sec. 332. On the subsidiary’s liquidation, the parent recognized a loss, a loss that would have gone
unrecognized if Code Sec. 332’s predecessor had
applied. The court concluded that the predecessor’s
application was functionally elective, citing 1954
legislative history that “strongly” and “inescapably”
supported its conclusion.148
In repealing the General Utilities doctrine, Congress
never questioned that functional electivity. In fact, in
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Code Sec. 338, Congress adopted a related provision
that made the election explicit when the parent and
subsidiary were affiliated: If a buyer bought the target
stock from the parent in a qualified stock purchase,
the parent recognized its gain or loss on the target
stock, unless the purchaser and parent made a Code
Sec. 338(h)(10) election.149 That approach suggests
that Congress continues to endorse functional electivity after the repeal.150
The treatment of Code Sec. 332 liquidations should
inform the treatment of upstream and downstream
Code Sec. 368 reorganizations: In each case, a
parent’s gain (or loss) in subsidiary stock should
be eliminated without recognition. As with a Code
Sec. 332 liquidation, the corporations in an acquisitive reorganization combine to create an economic
unit, and the surviving corporation is treated as a
continuation of the terminating corporation.151 Gain
nonrecognition in each case is also consistent with
historic dividend theory.152
In addition, as with a Code Sec. 332 liquidation,
that nonrecognition for an upstream or downstream
transaction may be functionally elective. If the parent
liquidates, rather than combining with the subsidiary,
it may recognize loss (or gain) on the liquidation.153 In
other
er words,
w
words, the
th form of the transaction may control
thee tax cons
not an uncommon occurrence
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sequ
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SSubchapter
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If the transaction is characterized as a
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its
gain or loss on subsidiaryy stock;
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as a Code Sec. 331 liquidation, the parent would.
The trick, then, would be to characterize the upstream and downstream transaction, and the IRS and
taxpayers should focus on that characterization. That
characterization requires drawing a line, and inevitably, there will be little substantive difference between
cases just above and below the line.
Note that the most difficult of those transactions
to treat as a reorganization may be a downstream
transaction where the parent’s only significant asset
is subsidiary stock.155 If the parent’s shareholders receive newly issued subsidiary stock that is identical
to the parent’s stock, the transaction is little different
in substance than if the parent had simply distributed
its stock.156 On that latter distribution, assuming that
Code Sec. 336 applied, the parent would recognize
any realized gain.157 Certainly, it would be reasonable

(if not highly preferable) to characterize that transaction as a liquidation.

C. Consolidated Issues—
The Unified Loss Rules
More ink has been spilled in coordinating the General
Utilities repeal with the consolidated return rules
than with any other set of rules. The principal focus
has been on loss disallowance rules, rules currently
found in Reg. §1.1502-36, which are discussed below. Another consolidated concern is basis shifting,
a topic that this article will not address.158

1. Background
The first significant regulatory response to the
General Utilities repeal was the loss disallowance
rule of Reg. §1.1502-20. In general, that regulation provided that a consolidated group was not
allowed a loss deduction on its disposition of subsidiary stock.159 This loss disallowance was limited
in two ways. First, under a netting provision, the
loss was allowed to the extent the group took gain
into account “as a consequence of the same plan
or arrangement [and] with respect to stock of the
same subsidiary having the same material terms.”160
Further, the loss on any share of subsidiary stock
was allowed to the extent it exceeded the sum of
three factors: the share’s allocable portion of the
subsidiary’s extraordinary gain, positive adjustments and duplicated loss.161 If a group did not
own a subsidiary for too long,162 the three factors
were intended to allow the group to recognize its
economic
conomic loss when
when it sold
so d the
the subsidiary
ubsidiary
y stock,
s oc
except
xcept to the
he extent
extent the loss
loss was
was duplicated
duplicated in
n the
th
basis of subsidiary assets (or loss carryovers). In
practice, the three factors were less than perfect
and proved a source of some irritation.
Reg. §1.1502-20 was invalidated, at least in part,
by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
Rite Aid Corp.163 The court concluded that the rule
exceeded the Treasury’s delegated authority under
Code Sec. 1502.164
Rite Aid had sold the stock of a subsidiary member,
recognizing a loss. Because that loss was less than
the subsidiary member’s “duplicated loss” (as computed under Reg. §1.1502-20(c)), the government
disallowed the entire stock under Reg. §1.1502-20.
The Court of Federal Claims had supported the
disallowance, but on appeal, the Federal Circuit
reversed. The lower court had concluded that Reg.
§1.1502-20 was valid, explaining that:
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The duplicated loss rule in [Reg. §1.1502-20(c)]
prohibits the opportunity that would exist—without the Regulation—for the affiliated group to
recognize a loss on a sale of stock of the subsidiary and for the purchaser to recognize the same
loss. By prohibiting the use of the same loss in the
hands of the seller and purchaser, the Regulation
assists in achieving the purpose of all regulations
issued under I.R.C. §1502 “clearly to reflect the
income-tax liability” of both members and former
members of the affiliated group and to “prevent
avoidance of such tax liability.”165
Because the lower court treated Rite Aid’s loss on
the subsidiary stock and the subsidiary’s built-in loss
on its assets as essentially the same loss (a singleentity approach), it concluded that Reg. §1.1502-20
did not deny the Rite Aid group its economic loss. It
noted that the group could have recognized the builtin loss on the subsidiary assets, either by selling the
assets directly or by joining with the buyer to make
a Code Sec. 338(h)(10) election for the sale of the
subsidiary stock.166 It also noted that by not making
the election, Rite Aid likely benefitted from the asset
loss, since the buyer presumably paid more for the
subsidiary
sidiaary stock
sstoc because of that built-in loss.167
Without
Wi
W
Witho
hout disc
di
discussing
cu
the lower court’s rationale,
the
he Federal
Federal Circuit
Circ
cu concluded
ncluded that Reg.
Reg. §1.1502-20
§1.15
denied
loss.
used as
enied Ritee Aid
d its
it economic
on
lo The court u
itss model
m
model an
an affi
afffiliated,
liat , nonconsolidated
nonconsolida ed group.
grou 168 A
nonconsolidated
could
stock
ncon
nsoli
lid
date
t group
gr
co l sell subsidiary
s b idi
and recognize a stock loss under Code Sec. 165(a)
without being restricted by Reg.
eg §1.1502-20,
§1.1502 20 while
wh
hilee
the buyer could preserve any
an built-in
uilt-in loss
los in
in the
th
he subsu sidiary assets. Perhaps reasoning that consolidated
groups should be treated no worse than nonconsolidated groups, the court found Reg. §1.1502-20
invalid, stating that:
... the duplicated loss factor distorts rather than
reflects the tax liability of consolidated groups
and contravenes Congress’ otherwise uniform
treatment of limiting deductions for the subsidiary’s losses.169
Citing 1928 legislative history, the court suggested
that Congress granted broad regulatory authority
for the consolidated return regulations to deal with
“problems” in filing consolidated returns.170 The court
added that “in the absence of a problem created from
the filing of consolidated returns, [the Treasury] is

without authority to change the application of the tax
code provisions to a [consolidated group].”171 Reg.
§1.1502-20, the court concluded, did not address
any such problems.172
For many reasons, the Federal Circuit’s decision in
Rite Aid seems misguided, including that the court
did not adequately account for the General Utilities
repeal.173 Under the repeal, a corporation should not
enjoy duplicate benefits for the same economic loss.
If Reg. §1.1502-20 did not apply, Rite Aid enjoyed
duplicate benefits, selling the subsidiary stock and
recognizing a loss, while receiving additional consideration to compensate for the inside subsidiary loss.174
Further, under the repeal, a corporation must recognize gain when it sells an appreciated asset and
the asset takes a stepped-up basis. As a corollary,
a corporation should not recognize a loss if it sells
a built-in loss asset, the asset remains in corporate
solution, but its basis is not stepped down (so that
the basis preserves or duplicates the loss). Like gain
elimination, this loss duplication undermines the
corporate tax, even if later use of the built-in loss is
somehow limited (e.g., under Code Sec. 382).
The corollary justifies the duplicated loss rule under
Reg. §1.1502-20. It could apply only if the group sold
its subsidiary stock at a loss, but the loss was duplicated in the subsidiary’s attributes. Because of the
investment adjustment rules under Reg. §1.1502-32,
a consolidated group appropriately is treated as an
economic unit and a single entity.175 Under a singleentity approach, the stock and asset losses should
be viewed as the “same” loss, so that a consolidated
group
would
violate
the cor
corollary
recognized
roup wou
ld vio
olate th
ollary iff itt re
cognized a
subsidiary
losss thatt w
was
duplicated
(i.e.,
preubs diary stock los
as dup
d
i ated (i.
e., pre
served) in the subsidiary attributes. In several possible
ways, therefore, the General Utilities repeal supported
the duplicated loss rule under Reg. §1.1502-20.
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Rite
Aid stands, and Congress quickly responded to Rite
Aid, adding the following sentence to the end of
Code Sec. 1502:
In carrying out the preceding sentence, the Secretary may prescribe rules that are different from
the provisions of chapter 1 that would apply if
such corporations filed separate returns.176
The amendment overturns Rite Aid “to the extent
[Rite Aid] suggests that [the Treasury] is required
to identify a problem created from the filing of
consolidated returns in order to issue regulations
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that change the application of a Code provision.”177
However, it apparently does not authorize the
Treasury to re-adopt the “duplicated loss” piece
of Reg. §1.1502-20.178 Despite that limitation, the
amendment supports using presumptions to disallow
subsidiary stock loss179 and also supports reducing
subsidiary attributes to deal with duplicated loss.180

2. An Overview of the Rules
This portion of the article describes the rules in Reg.
§1.1502-36. For those schooled in the consolidated
return area, the examples set out below may be of the
most interest.181 For those unfamiliar with the area, the
description will aid in understanding the examples
and the suggestions for revising Reg. §1.1502-36
that follow.182
The regulation has three basic rules, a basisredetermination rule, basis-reduction rule and
attribute-reduction rule. Each rule is discussed in turn.
a. The Basis-Redetermination Rule. Reg. §1.150236(b) contains a basis-redetermination rule, which
“supplement[s] the operation of the investment
adjustment system [of Reg. §1.1502-32]” and is intended “to prevent the realization of noneconomic
loss and facilitate the elimination of duplicated loss
when
en members
m
mem
mbe hold [subsidiary (“S”)] stock with
disparate
sp
paraate bases.”
b es. 183 Under this rule, a group
base
g
may
reallocate
previously
applied
investment
eallocate pre
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d inve
tment aadjustments
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but the group’s
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nts among
a ongg its
amo
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m mb
sh
g
aggregate
stock
will remai
remain the sa
same.184
gg
gregaate S st
toc
ck basis
asis wil
Through
ough
h the
the reallocations,
rea oc
ns the basis-redetermination
asis r d t
i
rule performs
a function similar to Code Sec. 704(c),
f
although less precisely.
i. Transfer Requirement.
t. For
F the
he basis-redeterminabasis-redeterm n tion rule to apply, a member (“M”) must transfer an
S loss share.185 Generally, M transfers an S share on
the earliest of the following186:
(i) the date that M ceases to own the share because
of a transaction in which, but for Reg. §1.150236, the member would recognize gain or loss187;
(ii) the date that M and S cease to be members of the
same consolidated group188;
(iii) the date that a nonmember acquires the share
from M; and
(iv) the date that the S share becomes worthless under
Code Sec. 165(g) and Reg. §1.1502-80(c) (if the
share is not treated as a capital asset) or the last
day of the tax year which includes that date (if
the share is treated as a capital asset).
However, M is not treated as transferring an S share
if M ceases to own the share because of:

(i) a Code Sec. 381 transfer in which M or S acquires
assets from the other, as long as M recognizes no
gain or loss on the share189; or
(ii) a distribution of the share to a nonmember in a
transaction to which Code Sec. 355 applies if
the share is qualified property under Code Sec.
355(c) or Code Sec. 361(c).190
ii. Operation of the Rule. (A) Scope. If M transfers
an S loss share, the basis-redetermination rule applies, except in the following two cases:
(i) there is no disparity among members’ bases in
shares of S common stock,191 and no member
owns S preferred stock with built-in gain or
loss192; or
(ii) all S shares held by a members are transferred to
one or more nonmembers in one fully taxable
transaction.193
If the second of these exceptions would apply, however, the group’s common parent (“P”) may elect to
apply the basis-redetermination rule, and if stock of
more than one subsidiary is transferred, the election
may be made for one or more of the subsidiaries.194
(B) General Application. If the basis-redetermination rule applies to M’s transfer of an S loss share,
positive adjustments may be reallocated from transferred S loss common stock, and negative adjustments
may be reallocated from shares of S common stock
that are not transferred loss shares.195 More specifically, and subject to the limitations described below,
the reallocations occur as follows:
(i) M’s basis in each transferred loss share of S common stock is reduced (but not below its value) by
removing
emov ng positive
p
positivve adjustments
a ustments previously
previou
usly applied
applie
tto
o the
he basis of tthe
he share.
are 196
(ii) If a transferred S share is still a loss share after the
first step, M reduces its basis in the share (but not
below its value) by reallocating negative adjustments to the share from members’ S common
shares that are not transferred loss shares.197 If
there are both preferred and common transferred
loss shares, the reallocation is made first to the
preferred shares and then to the common shares.198
(iii) The positive adjustments removed in the first step
are first reallocated to increase the member’s
basis in gain shares of S preferred stock (but not
above their value).199 Any remaining amount is
reallocated to increase the group’s basis in common stock.200
The group makes these reallocations (both to and
from members’ shares of S stock) using any “reasonable” method or formula that, to the greatest
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extent possible, reduces the basis disparity among
the members’ S preferred stock and among the
members’ S common stock to the greatest extent
possible.201 To the extent possible, the reallocations are made first with respect to the earliest
available adjustments.202
The basis-redetermination rule has the following
implicit presumption: The investment adjustment
rules do not specially allocate built-in gain or loss
on assets contributed to S by a member. That presumption may be wrong if S has tracking stock,
potentially affording a group tax benefits exceeding
its economic loss.
Example—Tracking stock. P owns all S1 and S2
stock, and for valid business reasons, P, S1 and
S2 form S3, each transferring $100 to S3 for S3
interests. S3 is a partnership that will elect to be
taxed as a corporation, and it acquires three assets,
Assets 1, 2 and 3, each for $100. S1’s S3 interest
(“Share 1”), which is nonvoting, will be allocated
90 percent of the profits and 100 percent of losses
relating to Asset 1, plus five percent of any other
S3 profits. S2’s S3 interest (“Share 2”), which is also
nonvoting, will be allocated 90 percent of the profits and
of the losses relating to Asset
d 100
10
00 percent
p
2,, plus
of anyy other S3 profits. P’s S3
plu
lus five
v percent
peer
interest
(“Share
only voting interest,
in
ntere
est ((“
“Sha
Share 3”), the onl
nterest, will
bee allocated
S3
losses.
allocatted all
a remaining
ai
3 profits and loss
Initially,
nitial
iti ll
lly, each
e h asset
ass generates
enera s at least
l t $100
$10 of
profits, all of which are distributed to the S3
owners.203 Over time, how
however,
ver, Ass
Asset
set 1 dec
declines
lines
in value to $0, Asset 2 retains
reta its $100
$100 value,
va ue and
and
Asset 3 appreciates in value to $200, although
each asset still has a $100 basis. Each share also
still has a $100 basis, but Shares 1, 2 and 3 have
$5, $105 and $190 values, respectively.204
S1 sells Share 1 to a nonmember for $5.205 That
share is a transferred loss share and under the
basis-redetermination rule, $95 of positive adjustments are reallocated from Share 1 to Shares 2
and 3, $5 to Share 2 and $90 to Share 3.206 Thus,
each S3 share has a basis equal to its value, and S1
recognizes no gain or loss on the sale of Share 1.
Later, S3 sells Asset 1 for $0, recognizing a $100
loss, all of which is absorbed by the P group.
Because Share 1, the S3 interest now owned by
a nonmember, bears all of that loss, none of the

negative adjustment for the loss is allocated to
Shares 2 or 3.207 Thus, P and S2 retain fair market
value bases in those shares.
P and S2 sell their S3 shares for $190 and $105,
respectively, each recognizing no gain or loss.
Thus, because of the basis-redetermination rule,
the group enjoyed a $100 loss on Asset 1 and also
offset potential gain using used $95 of reallocated
basis associated with that loss. Consequently, the
group enjoyed an aggregate $195 tax benefit from
a $100 economic loss.
The example illustrates that the basis-redetermination rule not only may fail to adequately deal with
misallocations under Reg. §1.1502-32, it may allow
the group to enjoy a noneconomic loss.208
b. The Basis-Reduction Rule. The basis-reduction
rule is intended to prevent noneconomic loss and
promote the clear reflection of the group’s income.209
Thus, among other transactions, the basis-reduction
rule targets the “son-of-mirrors” transaction.
i. General Rule. If a member (“M”) transfers a subsidiary (“S”) share and the share is a loss share after
applying the basis-redetermination rule (and other
applicable rules of law), the share’s basis is reduced
by the smallest of:
(i) its net positive adjustment,
(ii) its disconformity amount, or
(iii) the excess, if any, of its basis over its value.210
(A) Net Positive Adjustment. A share’s net positive
adjustment equals the sum of all investment adjustments
refl
ected
share’s
basis
(or, if gre
greater,
men s re
flec
ted in the shar
e s bas
iis (or
ate
$0).
0).2111 For this purpose,
pu p e, investment
inve tme t adjustments
adjusstmen
include the adjustments described in Reg. §1.150232(b)(2) for taxable income and loss, tax-exempt
income and noncapital, nondeductible items.212
Note that these adjustments also include any noncapital, nondeductible expenses arising because of
an election under Reg. §1.1502-36(d)(6) to reattribute attributes of S or a lower-tier subsidiary.213
(B) Disconformity Amount. A share’s disconformity
amount is the excess, if any, of:
(i) M’s basis in the share, over
(ii) the share’s allocable portion of S’s net inside attribute amount.214
S determines its net inside attribute amount as of
the transfer.215 That amount equals the sum of S’s net
operating and capital loss carryovers,216 deferred
deductions,217 money and basis in noncash property,
reduced by the amount of S’s liabilities.218
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Generally, if S owns a share of lower-tier subsidiary
(“L”) stock, it computes its net inside attribute amount
using its basis in that share, adjusted for any gain or
loss recognized in the transaction on that share.219
However, if S owns any L shares not transferred in
the same transaction, it instead uses a special basis
amount for those shares.220
ii. Netting Rule. Finally, solely to compute the basis
reduction required under Reg. §1.1502-36(c), the
bases of any transferred S loss shares are reduced by
any gain taken into account by members on S gain
shares, provided that:
(i) the gain and loss shares are transferred in the
same transaction (whether or not they have the
same material terms221); and
(ii) the gain is taken into account as of the transaction. 222
The reduction is made in proportion to each loss
share’s relative built-in loss.223 The group will take this
reduced basis for a loss share into account in computing the share’s disconformity amount, one of the
three items compared in determining any reduction
under the basis-reduction rule.224
iii. An Example.
Example—“Son-of-mirrors”
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225
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P sells its S share to X, an unrelated corporation,
for $70. The basis-redetermination rule does not
apply because P sold all S stock to a nonmember in a taxable transaction.226 Further, P is not
required to reduce its basis in its S share under
the basis-reduction rule. Although the S share has
a $30 net positive adjustment227 and its basis exceeds its value by $30, its disconformity amount
is $0.228 Because P reduces its S share basis by the
smallest of those three amounts (i.e., $0), it retains
its $100 basis in the S share and recognizes a $30
loss on its sale to X.
Although the attribution-reduction rule will apply
to require S to reduce its basis in the land by $30,
from $70 to $40,229 this transaction may still allow
a benefit that should be targeted by the General

Utilities repeal. For example, for regulatory or other
business reasons, it may have been impossible for S
to sell its land, and the Y group may have been unable to fully utilize any loss on the S stock (or land).230
Thus, it may have sold the S stock to P to maximize
the benefit of that loss, a benefit facilitated by the
basis-reduction rule.
c. Attribute-Reduction Rule.
i. The Attribute Reduction Amount. If a transferred
subsidiary (“S”) share is still a loss share after taking
into account the basis-redetermination and basisreduction rules (and other applicable rules), the
attributes of S (and its lower-tier subsidiaries) may
be reduced by the smaller of:
(i) S’s net stock loss, and
(ii) its aggregate inside loss.231
The regulations refer to this amount as the “attribute
reduction amount.”232 This rule does not apply absent
the group’s election, however, if the aggregate attribute reduction amount in the transaction is less than
five percent of the total value of the shares transferred
by members in the transaction.233
S’s net stock loss is computed by looking to the S
shares that members transfer in the transaction and
equals the excess, if any, of (A) the aggregate basis of
those shares over (B) their aggregate value.234 For this
purpose, the shares’ aggregate basis is computed after
taking into account any adjustments required under
the basis-redetermination and basis-reduction rules.235
S’s aggregate inside loss equals the excess, if any,
of (A) S’s net inside attribute amount (NIAA) over (B)
the value of all outstanding S shares.236 As under the
basis-reduction
basi - eduction rule,
rule, S’s
S NIAA
NIA
AA generally
gene ally equals
equal the
th
sum
operating
capital
carryovers,
um of S’s net o
peraat
and ca
pital loss
oss car
ryover
deferred deductions, money and basis in noncash
property, reduced by the amount of S’s liabilities.237
However, S’s computation of its NIAA is modified if
S holds lower-tier subsidiary stock because S must
take its “deemed basis” in that stock into account.238
ii. Reducing Attributes. If the attribute-reduction
rule applies, S may reduce the following categories
of attributes:
(A) capital loss carryovers;
(B) net operating loss carryovers;
(C) deferred deductions; and
(D) the basis of any other property, other than cash
and cash equivalents.239
Those reductions are effective immediately before
the transfer of relevant S loss share and are not treated
as noncapital, nondeductible expenses for purposes
of Reg. §1.1502-32.240

TAXES—THE TAX MAGAZINE®
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2304374

251

The Scope of the General Utilities Repeal
The common parent may specify the allocation of the
attribute reduction among the first three categories of
attributes.241 Absent that specification, those attributes
are reduced in the order set out above.242 Capital loss
carryovers are reduced before net operating loss carryovers, but within either category, carryovers from the
earliest years are reduced first.243 Deferred deductions
are then proportionately reduced.244
If S’s attribute reduction amount does not exceed
its total attributes in the first three categories, all of
the attribute reduction amount must be applied to
reduce those attributes.245 If S’s attribute reduction
amount equals or exceeds its total attributes in the
first three categories, S eliminates those attributes,
and any excess attribute reduction amount reduces
S’s basis in its noncash assets, including any lowertier subsidiary stock.246
If S owns lower-tier subsidiary stock, that excess
is first allocated between that stock and its other
noncash assets.247 If S owns no lower-tier subsidiary
stock, that excess is allocated entirely among those
other noncash assets. For convenience, I call the portion of the excess allocated to noncash assets other
than lower-tier subsidiary stock the “non-cash ARA.”
Any portion of the noncash ARA allocated to an asset
reduces
asset’s basis.248 The noncash ARA is allocess the
e as
cated,
ateed,
d iin
n order,
ord
d to Class VII assets, then Class VI assets,
der,
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Class
assets,
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5
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class.250
If the attribute reduction
n aamount
unt ex
exceeds
ceeds th
the
e av
availa able attributes in the four categories listed above, the
excess is disregarded and has no further effect, except
as follows: That excess is suspended “[t]o the extent
of any liabilities of S that are not taken into account
for tax purposes before the transfer.”251 The suspended
amount is “applied proportionately to reduce any
amounts attributable to S that would be deductible
or capitalizable as a result of such liabilities being
taken into account by S or any other person.”252
Example—Duplicate benefit. P owns all five
shares of the only class of outstanding S stock. It
has a $200 basis in each share, and S owns one
asset with a $1,000 basis and $500 value.
P sells one S share to X for $100.253 Neither the
basis-redetermination rule nor basis-reduction

rule applies.254 Thus, P recognizes a $100 loss
on the sale.
S must reduce its attributes by its attribute reduction amount, which is $100 or the smaller of:
(i) $100, its net stock loss,255 and
(ii) $500, its aggregate inside loss.256
Under the attribute reduction rule, S reduces the
basis in its asset by $100, from $1,000 to $900.257
Later, S sells the asset to a nonmember for $500,
recognizing a $400 loss, and the P group absorbs
the loss. P reduces its S stock basis by $320 (80
percent of $400), from $800 to $480.258 S buys
other assets for $500.
P sells its remaining S stock to Y for $400. Assume
that the basis-redetermination and basis-reduction rules do not apply.259 Thus, P recognizes an
$80 loss. Further, because S’s net inside attributes
(i.e., its $500 asset basis) equal the S stock value,
S is not required to reduce its attributes under the
attribute-reduction rule.
Overall, unless an anti-abuse rule applies (and
it is not clear that one would), the P group has
enjoyed a $580 tax loss ($100 loss on P’s sale
of the S share to X, a $400 loss on S’s asset sale,
and an $80 loss on P’s sale of the S shares to Y)
but
bu suffered
suffered only
on
nly a $500
$ 00 economic
ec nom c loss (i.e.,
(i.ee., the
decline
deccline in
in value
value of
of S’s asset).
asseet).22600
Thus, despite its detail, the attribute-reduction rule
may still allow the group to benefit from an noneconomic loss.261
iii. Special Lower-Tier Subsidiary Stock Rules. A
tangled set of rules applies to determine the attribute
reduction amount when S owns lower-tier subsidiary
(“L”) stock.262 The reduction itself is applied from the
top down the chain, but to allocate the reduction,
“deemed basis” computations must first be made
from the bottom up.
(A) Deemed Basis. Generally, for purposes of
determining the attribute reduction amount, any L
shares that S holds immediately before the transaction are treated as a single share, and in computing
its aggregate inside loss, S uses the L shares’ “deemed
basis.”263 That deemed basis equals the greater of:
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(i) the sum of S’s basis in each share of L stock,
adjusted for any gain or loss recognized on the
transfer of L shares as part of the transaction
whether or not allowed; and
(ii) the portion of L’s net inside attribute amount allocable to S’s L stock.264
If S owns a chain of lower-tier subsidiaries, the
deemed basis is computed first for the lowest-tier
subsidiary (or subsidiaries), and then computed successively up the chain.265
(B) Allocating the Attribute Reduction Amount. If S’s
attribute reduction amount exceeds its total loss carryovers and deferred deductions, S eliminates those
attributes, and any excess attribute reduction amount
reduces S’s basis in its noncash assets, including any
L stock.266 If S has L stock and other noncash assets,
that amount is allocated between the two groups
of assets in proportion to the aggregate “adjusted”
deemed bases of the L stock and the aggregate bases
of the other noncash assets.267
The “adjusted” deemed basis of L stock equals its
deemed basis (computed as described above), minus
the following amounts:
(i) the value of S’s transferred L shares; and
(ii) the excess, to the extent allocable to S’s nontransferred
shares, of L’s “non-loss” assets over its
ferr
ed L sh
268
68
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li
liab
b
bili ies.26
bilitie
Lss “n
L’s
“non-loss”
non-loss”
oss” aassets are:
(i)
equivalents,
i) its cash
c h and
d cash
c
eq
en
(ii)
owns
subsidiary
i) if L ow
wns aanyy llower-tier
wer-tier subsidia
y (“G”) stock,
value
off L’s transferred
stock,
the valu
th
lue o
t sferred G stoc
k and
(iii) for each direct and indirect lower-tier subsidiary,
the portion of the subsidiary’s
bs ary’s “non-loss”
“n
non lo
oss” assets
assets
(net of liabilities) allocable
loc e to the subsidiary’s
subs diary s
nontransferred shares.269
If any of S’s attribute reduction amount is allocated
to its L shares, it is apportioned among those shares
and applied to reduce their bases as follows: No
amount is apportioned to any transferred L share if
gain or loss was recognized on the transfer.270 Instead,
the apportioned amount is allocated among S’s other
L shares, first to S’s basis in loss shares of L preferred
stock and then to S’s basis in all remaining shares of
L common stock, subject to the following rules:
(i) the allocations must reduce basis disparity to the
greatest extent possible;
(ii) if an allocation is made to a preferred share
or is made to a common share transferred in
a nonrecognition transaction, the allocation
cannot reduce the share’s basis below its
value; and

(iii) the allocation to any other common share is
applied to reduce basis without regard to the
share’s value.271
If any portion of the amount allocated to S’s L
shares cannot be applied to reduce their bases (e.g.,
because they are all transferred shares on which gain
or loss was recognized), it has no further effect on
S’s attributes.272
(C) Tiering Down the Attribute Reduction Amount.
The full portion of S’s attribute reduction amount allocated to its L shares is an attribute reduction amount
of L, even if not fully applied to reduce S’s basis in
its L shares.273 That “tier-down” amount, together
with any amount computed for transferred L shares
(the “direct” attribute reduction amount), is applied
to reduce L’s attributes under Reg. §1.1502-36(d).274
(D) Other Adjustments. The regulations also contain
two rules that may restore L’s attributes or L stock basis
to better conform inside and outside bases.275 The
first rule limits the attribute reduction amount that
tiers down from S to L. That “tier-down” amount is
limited to the excess of L’s net inside attribute amount
allocable to the L shares held by members as of the
transaction, over the following sum:
(i) L’s direct attribute reduction amount,276 plus
(ii) the aggregate value of L shares transferred by
members in the transaction for which any gain
or loss was recognized,277 plus
(iii) the aggregate basis of other L shares transferred by
members in the transaction, reduced by any direct
attribution reduction amount for the transfer of
those shares,278 plus
(iv)
v) the
the group’s
g oup s aggregate
a eg e basis
aggr
basi in
in any
any nontransferred
nontransferre
79
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of the
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Second, after the attribute-reduction rule is applied
to all transferred subsidiary stock, a basis reduction in an L share under that rule may be restored.
The reduction is reversed to the extent necessary to
conform the basis of any L share held by a member
to the share’s allocable portion of the L’s net inside
attribute amount (“L’s NIAA”).280 L’s NIAA is generally
computed as provided in Reg. §1.1502-36(c)(5)281
with the following modifications:
(i) the computation takes into account L’s actual
basis in any subsidiary stock, after the application
of Reg. §1.1502-36(d); and
(ii) L’s NIAA is reduced by any attribute reduction
amount suspended because of L’s “contingent”
liabilities.282
These restoration adjustments are made up the
chain from the lowest- to the highest-tier sub-
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sidiary, are computed and applied separately at
each tier, and do not tier-up to affect the bases of
higher-tier shares.283
Finally, a group may elect not to restore L stock
basis or L attributes.284 By making either election,
the group would forego a potential tax benefit,
but it might make the tier-down computations
(relatively) simpler.285
iv. Elections to Reduce Potential for Loss Duplication. The regulation also offers a group facing attribute
reduction a combination of two elective alternatives
to reduce or limit attribute reduction.286 First, the
group may elect to reduce its basis in transferred S
loss shares.287 Second, if S becomes a nonmember,
the group may elect to reattribute loss carryovers or
deferred deductions.288 If the common parent elects
both to reattribute a subsidiary’s attributes and reduce
subsidiary stock basis, the reattribution is given effect
before the stock basis reduction.289 The group reduces
its attribute reduction amount to the extent that, by
election, it reduces its basis in transferred S loss shares
or reattributes loss carryovers or deferred deductions.

3. Revising the Unified Loss Rules
The Treasury and the IRS deserve plaudits for the unified losss rul
rules.
les. They are detailed, clearly written and
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well considered, in short, a masterful
xtrraord
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Another
h approach should be adopted. The unified loss rules can reach
h results
r ul s inconsistent
nc
consistent with
w h
the General Utilities repeal,
eal, as the examples
examp es set out
o t
above illustrate. More problematically, the rules are
overwhelmingly complex, both to understand and
administer, a complexity that often can be traced to
allowing subsidiary stock to be treated sometimes as
a separate asset and sometimes as an indirect interest in subsidiary assets. Other than a few highly paid
experts, it seems unlikely that most can apply the
rules as intended, even in the typical case. Further,
consolidated groups rarely maintain the information
necessary to implement the rules (e.g., records of the
investment adjustments kept with sufficient precision)
and will often find it difficult and costly to uncover
that information on a stock sale. Finally, it seems
unlikely that most agents will have the expertise (or
patience) to apply the rules correctly. Thus, the rules
may be applied unevenly, often to the disadvantage
of the fisc.

If the approach of Reg. §1.1502-36 is abandoned,
there is one obvious candidate to take its place—the
approach reflected in Reg. §1.1502-20, the regulation that Reg. §1.1502-36 ultimately replaced. The
Reg. §1.1502-20 approach was much simpler to
understand and apply,290 although legislation may
be necessary to return to that approach. The Treasury
and the IRS should seek that legislation.291

D. Partnership Issues
Although a partnership in some ways is treated as an
entity separate from its partners, it also is sometimes
treated as an aggregate of its partners. That aggregate
treatment may raise questions about how the corporate and partnership tax rules interact.
The first part of this section describes how those two
sets of rules generally are coordinated. The second
and third parts describes how that coordination may
be affected by the General Utilties repeal.

1. Coordinating Subchapters C
and K—In General
If a partnership holds stock of a corporate partner
and the partner pays a dividend on that stock or the
partnership sells the stock, any income, gain, or loss
allocated to the partner is eliminated.
Example—Coordinating Code Secs. 705 and
1032. P and X form partnership PX, with each
contributing $50 for an undivided 50-percent
interest in the partnership capital and profits.
Among other assets, PX buys P stock for $50.
on PX’s
In its
t firrst
st year,
year, P pays
p s a $6 dividend
dividend
id
PX s
is allocated
P sstock,
tock, half of which
w
wh
allocated to P. Under
U
Under
Code Sec. 702(b), P characterizes its $3 share of
the dividend as a payment directly to itself (i.e.,
essentially as a payment between divisions).
Because a payment between corporate divisions
does not result in an accession to overall corporate wealth, P excludes the payment from its
gross income.292 However, because the value of
P’s partnership interest increases by the amount
of the payment, for purposes of Code Sec. 705,
P must treat the dividend as exempt income and
increase its basis in its PX interest by $3.293
Suppose that the P stock held by PX increases in
value by $20, and PX sells the stock to an unrelated person for $70. Under Code Sec. 1001(a),
PX realizes a $20 gain, half of which is allocated
to P. Under Code Sec. 702(b), P characterizes
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the gain as if P had realized the gain on a sale
or exchange of its stock. Because a corporation
recognizes no gain or loss on the sale or exchange of its stock, P excludes that gain from its
gross income.294 Under Code Sec. 705(a)(1), P
increases its PX basis by $10 to account for that
excluded gain.295
Thus, if the partnership sells partner stock, the partner may increase its basis in its partnership interest
to account for that gain. However, if that increase
occurred unchecked, the partner could effectively
recognize a loss associated with the sale of its stock,
inconsistent with Code Sec. 1032.
Example—Avoiding Code Sec. 1032. X, Y and Z
form partnership XYZ as equal one-third partners.
Z contributes P stock with a $0 basis and $100
value for its XYZ interest. Subsequently, when
XYZ is still worth $300 and the P stock is still
worth $100, P buys Z’s interest in XYZ for $100.
Assume that the partnership has not made a Code
Sec. 754 election.
The partnership sells the P stock for $100. Under
Code
the entire $100 gain on the P
ode Sec.
Secc. 704(c),
7
stock
st
tockk is
i allocated
alllloca
ll at to P as Z’s successor.296 Assume
that
th
hat P increases
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i its PXY
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$100,, from
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om $100
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Reg. §1.705-2 addresses the Code Sec. 1032
avoidance illustrated by the preceding example by
determining P’s basis adjustment under Code Sec.
705 as if the partnership had had a Code Sec. 754
election in effect.297 Thus, P could not avoid Code Sec.
1032 because it would take into account no net gain
on the partnership’s sale of the P stock, it would not
increase its PXY basis to account for the sale, and it
would not recognize loss on the distribution.

2. Reg. §1.337(d)-3—
The May Company Regulations
As the preceding examples illustrate, if a corporation
is a partner in a partnership that holds the partner’s
stock, that corporation is treated for tax purposes in
many ways the same as if it directly held that stock

(i.e., it is equivalent to treasury stock). That practical
equivalence supports treating a corporate partner
as redeeming its stock when a partnership acquires
stock of the partner or a corporation acquires an
interest in a partnership that owns the corporation’s
stock. Proposed regulations, in fact, take that approach, proposing a deemed redemption and also a
distribution rule.298
a. The Deemed Redemption Rule.
i. Partner Stock. As proposed, the deemed redemption rule would apply “at the time of, and to
the extent that any transaction ... has the economic
effect of an exchange by a partner of its interest in
appreciated property for an interest in the stock of
the partner owned, acquired, or distributed by the
partnership.”299 If the partner recognizes gain, appropriate adjustments are made to the partner’s basis
in its partnership interest and the partnership’s basis
in its assets.300
Example—The deemed redemption rule. P and
X form a partnership as 50-percent partners, with
P contributing an asset with a $0 basis and $100
value and X contributing P stock with a $100
basis and $100 value. Because the transaction
has the economic effect of an exchange by P of
appreciated property for an interest in P stock,
the deemed redemption rule applies. P is treated
as exchanging an asset with a $0 basis and $50
value for 50 percent of the partnership’s P stock.
Under Code Sec. 311(b), P recognizes a $50 gain.
The partnership’s basis in the asset contributed by
P’ss basi
basiss in its partnership
interest
P and
nd P
artnership iin
terest sshould
ho ld
01
both
from
bo
h increase
inc ease by $50,
$
m $0
$0 to $50.
$50.301
Note that if rules like those found in Proposed Reg.
§1.337(d)-3 did not apply, a corporation could avoid
Code Sec. 311(b) gain by transferring appreciated
property to a partnership for a partnership interest
and later receiving a distribution of its stock in liquidation of its interest. If the distribution followed the
contribution by at least seven years, the corporation
could avoid gain on the contribution (Code Sec. 721),
distribution (Code Sec. 731) and subsequent sale of
the stock (Code Sec. 1032).302
In its recent report on Reg. §1.337(d)-3, the New
York State Bar Association supported applying the
deemed redemption rule in the preceding example
(i.e., when a partnership holds stock of a corporate
partner), a sensible conclusion for three possible
reasons, each noted in the report.303
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First, as the discussion above shows, if a partnership
owns stock of a partner (“P”), P’s partnership interest
resembles treasury stock to the extent it represents an
interest in that stock (the “treasury stock theory”).304 If
dividends are paid on the P stock and allocated to P,
P has no income. Further, if the partnership sells the
P stock, any gain or loss allocated to P is not recognized. Therefore, P holds an interest that resembles
treasury stock, and applying the deemed redemption
rule when P acquires that interest makes sense.
Second, the deemed redemption rule may be justified because if P acquires an interest in a partnership
that owns P stock, the acquisition effects a corporate
contraction (the “corporate contraction theory”), essentially depleting P’s assets.305 That depletion can
be demonstrated by considering the perspective of
a P creditor: The partnership arrangement removes
P assets that the creditor may use to satisfy its claim
against P. Although a P creditor may acquire an
interest in the P stock held by the partnership to
satisfy its debt, that interest will be subordinate to
its creditor’s interest.306
Finally, and most critically, the deemed redemption
rule may be justified because it seems rare that a
partnership would have a nontax business purpose for
holding
dingg P stock.
sttock 307 In the typical case, the partnership
appears
pp
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P cannot avoid gain through
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visi
still allow
w P tto
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defer
ef r
that gain. That deferral seems hard to justify because
P effects a redemption through a scheme that generally has no business purpose apart from saving tax.
The deemed redemption rule prevents that deferral.
Note that those partnership provisions would still
allow P to effect an economic redemption using
loss property and preserve the loss, inconsistent
with Code Sec. 311(a),310 but so do the proposed
regulations. The deemed redemption rule should also
address that concern.
Example—Loss property. P and X form a partnership as 50-percent partners, with P contributing
an asset with a $150 basis and $100 value and
X contributing P stock with a $100 basis and
$100 value. Although the transaction has the
economic effect of an exchange by P, the deemed

redemption rule does not apply because P has not
effected an exchange of appreciated property for
an interest in P stock.311 Thus, if the partnership
later sells the contributed property, P may be allocated and take into account the built-in loss,312
even if it later receives the P stock in redemption
of its partnership interest.313
To prevent the avoidance of Code Sec. 311(a), the
deemed redemption rule should be modified to apply
to P’s transfer of loss property. If so modified, P’s loss
would be disallowed under Code Sec. 311(a), the
partnership would take a fair market value basis in
the property transferred by P, and P would reduce its
partnership basis by the amount of the disallowed loss.
The deemed redemption rule should be modified
in at least one additional way. That rule applies when
P increases its interest in its stock held through a
partnership. The converse situation may also prove
problematic, however, since P may effectively recognize loss associated with its stock by reducing its
interest in its stock.
Example—Reverse “May Company” transaction.
P, Fred and Mary form a partnership, each contributing $100 cash. Thus, P takes a $100 basis in
its partnership interest. The partnership buys $100
of P stock and other assets. Assume that P has a
99-percent interest in the P stock (worth $99) and
a 0.5-percent interest in the other assets (worth
$1). The P stock held by the partnership declines
in value to $80, and the partnership
p liquidates P’s
interest,
distributing
worth
off as
assets
other
int
eres , di
strib
buting $80.20
0.20 w
ort o
sets oth
er
314
than
tha
n P stock
stock to
to P.31
Under
nder Code
Code Sec.
Sec. 731(a),
731(a) P
recognizes no gain or loss on the distribution, but
under Code Sec. 732(b), it takes a $100 basis in
the distributed assets. If P then sells those assets,
it recognizes a $19.80 loss.
If the partnership had sold the P stock for $80 while
P was a partner, the partnership would have had a
$20 loss, P would have been allocated a $19.80
share of that loss (99 percent of $20), P would have
reduced its outside basis by the same amount under
Code Sec. 705(a)(2), but under Code Secs. 702(b) and
1032, P would not have recognized that loss. Thus,
the transaction in the example allows P to avoid Code
Sec. 1032 and indirectly recognize a stock loss.
To address that concern, the deemed redemption
rule could be modified as follows: Immediately
before P reduces its interest in P stock held through
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a partnership, P should make the adjustment to its
partnership basis that it would have made if the
partnership had then sold the P stock for its fair market value. If that rule were in place in the previous
example, P would reduce its partnership basis by
$19.80 (i.e., its allocable share of the partnership’s
built-in loss on P stock) and would take only an
$80.20 basis in the distributed assets, preventing P
from avoiding Code Sec. 1032.315
ii. Affiliate Stock. Proposed Reg. §1.337(d)-3
applies not only to P stock but also to stock of a P
affiliate.316 For example, the deemed redemption rule
applies when P acquires a partnership interest and
the partnership owns stock of a P affiliate. This application cannot be justified, however, by the treasury
stock theory because P would recognize any allocable gain on the partnership’s sale of affiliate stock
and would include any allocable affiliate dividends
in gross income.317 However, both the corporate
contraction theory and business purpose doctrine
may support applying the deemed redemption rule
to affiliate stock.
The corporate contraction theory plays a prominent
role in the NYSBA report’s analysis. The report recommends restricting the application of the deemed
redemption
emp
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nlyy when
wh
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Note that if the affiliate is P’s subsidiary and P and the
affiliate combine, the corporate contraction theory
could then apply, and the report recommends that
the deemed redemption rule should apply at that
time.320 In addition, if P owns a partnership interest,
the partnership owns subsidiary affiliate (“S”) stock,
and P contributes its partnership interest to S, the
report recommends that the deemed redemption rule
also then apply.321
The report also considers brother-sister arrangements, relying on the lack of a corporate contraction
to recommend not applying the deemed redemption
rule to those arrangements.322 For example, suppose that P owns all stock of S1 and 90 percent of
the stock of S2. S1 and an unrelated person enter
into a partnership, with S1 contributing appreci-

ated property and the other partner contributing the
remaining 10-percent interest in S2 stock. Because
there is no direct or indirect corporate contraction of
S2 (as when a subsidiary is a partner in a partnership
that acquires parent stock), the report recommends
that the deemed redemption rule not apply when
the partnership is formed.323 However, if S1 and S2
merge, if S2 merges into P (and the partnership exchanges its S2 stock for P stock), or if P contributes
its S1 stock to S2 (so that S2 becomes S1’s parent),
the corporate contraction theory would apply, and
the report recommends that the deemed redemption
rule then apply.324
Although a corporate contraction theory may justify
limiting the deemed redemption rule, that limitation
makes the rule more difficult to administer. Further, it
may strain the resources of the IRS (and the memories
of taxpayers) to audit (and report) the appropriate
amount of gain when it is later triggered under the
more refined rule.
In any case, a focus on the corporate contraction
theory misses a critical point: It seems rare that a
partnership would have a nontax business purpose for
holding stock of a partner or its affiliate, and it seems
hard to justify accommodating transactions lacking
a valid nontax business purpose, particularly when
the added precision imports real complexity. The
better approach is to retain the deemed redemption
rule for affiliate stock.325 That absolute rule could be
softened by allowing taxpayers to seek its waiver by
private letter ruling in any case where a partnership’s
ownership of affiliate stock does not jeopardize the
General
Utilities
repeal.
Gen
eral U
ti it ess re
pea
Thee Distribution
addition to the
deemed
b. T
Th
D stribution Rule.
e. In
n additio
he d
eeme
redemption rule, Proposed Reg. §1.337(d)-3 includes
a distribution rule, which applies if a corporate
partner receives a distribution of its stock and other
property.326 Under the distribution rule, the distribution of stock is treated as a separate transaction that
occurs before the distribution of the other property.
This rule is overbroad and, except for transition purposes, should be eliminated.327
Example—Overbreadth of the distribution
rule. P and X form a partnership as 50-percent
partners, with P contributing an asset with a $0
basis and $100 value and X contributing P stock
with a $100 basis and $100 value. Because
the transaction has the economic effect of an
exchange by P of appreciated property for an
interest in P stock, the deemed redemption rule
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applies. P is treated as exchanging an asset with
a $0 basis and $50 value for 50 percent of the
partnership’s P stock. Under Code Sec. 311(b),
P recognizes a $50 gain. The partnership’s basis
in the asset contributed by P and P’s basis in its
partnership interest should both increase by $50,
from $0 to $50.328

the deemed redemption rule applies. P is treated
as exchanging an asset with a $0 basis and $50
value for 50 percent of the partnership’s P stock.
Under Code Sec. 311(b), P recognizes a $50 gain.
The partnership’s basis in the asset contributed by
P and P’s basis in its partnership interest should
both increase by $50, from $0 to $50.332

Sometime later, the partnership liquidates when
the value and bases of the relevant assets is
unchanged. (Assume that Code Sec. 704(c)(1)
(B) does not apply.) The partnership distributes
a 50-percent interest in each asset to each partner. Thus, P receives P stock worth $50 (i.e.,
the amount of stock deemed “redeemed”) and
a one-half interest in the asset it contributed,
worth $50. P is first treated as receiving its stock
in redemption of one-half of its partnership interest with a $25 basis and under Code Sec. 311(b)
recognizes a $25 gain. P is also deemed to receive
the remaining asset in a liquidating distribution
and takes a $25 basis in that asset.329

Sometime later, the partnership liquidates when
the bases of the relevant assets is unchanged but
the value of each asset has fallen to $50. (Assume
that Code Sec. 704(c)(1)(B) does not apply.) The
partnership distributes a 50-percent interest in
each asset to each partner. Thus, P receives P
stock worth $25 (i.e., the amount of stock deemed
“redeemed”) and a one-half interest in the asset it
contributed, also worth $25. Under the distribution rule, P is first treated as receiving its stock in
redemption of one-half of its partnership interest
with a $25 basis and under Code Sec. 311 recognizes no gain or loss. P is also deemed to receive
the remaining asset in a liquidating distribution,
and takes a $25 basis in that asset.333

Thus, overall, P recognizes a $75 gain on stock
worth only $50, a result that is possible only because
the dist
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tribu
utio rule applies an entity approach,
while
rule applies
an aghile
l the
th
h deemed
he
d me redemption
deem
p
pp
gregate
approach.
double-counting
would be
reg
gate app
proa
ach Thiss doub
e-coun ing wo
avoided
the
stock by
voided
d if P treated
trea
th distribution
rib
of P sto
the
he partnership
parttnership
p just
just like
ke a distribution
di tribution of cash
cas with
a value
that stock.
the example,
alue
l e equal
equ
uall tto th
tock Then,
en in th
if the partnership distributes P stock and the other
asset to P in liquidation,
n, P would
would be treated
treated just
just
like it had received cash
h of
o $50
50 (i.e.,
(i e., tthe
he value
vaalue off
the distributed P stock) and the other noncash asset.
In the example, P would recognize no gain or loss
because the cash deemed distributed would equal
P’s basis in its partnership interest,330 and P would
take a $0 basis in the other asset.331
Note that the distribution rule could also result in
an avoidance of Code Sec. 1032, as the following
example illustrates.
Example—Avoiding Code Sec. 1032. The facts
are the same as in the preceding example. Thus, P
and X form a partnership as 50-percent partners,
with P contributing an asset with a $0 basis and
$100 value and X contributing P stock with a
$100 basis and $100 value. Because the transaction has the economic effect of an exchange by P
of appreciated property for an interest in P stock,

Note that if the partnership had sold the P stock
immediately before the distribution, it would
have had a $50 loss on that stock ($100 basis
minus $50 amount realized), half of which
would have been allocated to P. Under Code
Sec. 702(b). P would have treated that loss as
a loss from the sale of its stock, which it would
not recognize under Code Sec. 1032. However,
under
Code
un
der C
ode Sec.
Sec. 705(a)(2)(B),
70 a)(2)(B , it would
would reduce
reduce
its basis
basis in
n its partnership
partn hip interest
inteerest by that
that disaldisallowed loss. Instead, in the transaction, P takes
a $25 basis in the distributed nonstock asset,
basis essentially shifted from the P stock, thereby
avoiding Code Sec. 1032.
The troubling result could be avoided if immediately before the partnership distributed the P stock
to P, P made the adjustment to its partnership basis
that it would have made if the partnership had
then sold its P stock for its fair market value. If the
partnership had sold the P stock, it would have recognized a $50 loss, half of which would have been
allocated to P, reducing its basis in its partnership
interest by $25, from $50 to $25.334 If, as was earlier
proposed, P treated the distribution of P stock by
the partnership just like a distribution of cash with
a value equal to that stock, P would be treated just
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like it had received cash of $25 (i.e., the value of
the distributed P stock) and the other noncash asset.
Then, P would recognize no gain or loss because the
cash deemed distributed would equal P’s basis in its
partnership interest,335 and P would take a $0 basis
in the other asset.336
The distribution rule, as originally proposed, not
only provided a backstop to the deemed redemption
rule but also targeted back-end partnership planning.
Example—Back-end planning. P holds a partnership interest with a $20 basis and $100 value.
Assume that the partnership owns a disregarded
entity that holds assets with an $80 basis and
$100 value. Sometime before the partnership
liquidates, it “checks the box” to treat the disregarded entity as a corporation. The partnership
is deemed to contribute the entity’s assets to a
corporation, recognizes no gain or loss on the
contribution and takes an $80 basis in the “stock”
deemed received.337 Further, the entity takes an
$80 basis in the contributed assets.338 The partnership distributes the stock to P in liquidation of P’s
partnership interest, and under Code Sec. 732, P
takes a $20 basis in the “stock.”339
Under
U
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der the
he dis
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distribution
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rule, before its modification
340
byy Notice
N
Notiice 93-2,
9
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2 34
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may
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e iirre
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l
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asset bases by liquidating the entity under Code Sec.
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$80
basiss o
orr
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b
joining with the entity in fi
filling consolidated
consolidated returns.
return .
Note that because of Notice 93-2, the distribution
rule would not apply in this example, so that P would
not recognize gain under that rule.
c. Code Sec. 732(f). At least in part, Code Sec.
732(f) now addresses the same back-end planning,
but it addresses a partnership issue (i.e., the avoidance of Code Sec. 732), not the General Utilities
repeal,342 and to the extent that Code Sec. 732(f) accommodates the repeal, it is by accident, not design.
Although Proposed Reg. §1.337(d)-3 generally should
eliminate the distribution rule, the rule should be
retained (as originally proposed and before its modification by Notice 93-2) to deal with a distribution that
causes a corporate partner and subsidiary to become
affiliated. The following discussion demonstrates why
Code Sec. 732(f) is an inadequate surrogate for such
a distribution rule.

Code Sec. 732(f) applies to a corporate partner if
the following requirements are met:
(i) the corporate partner receives a distribution from
a partnership of stock of another corporation (the
“distributed” corporation);
(ii) the corporate partner and the distributed corporation are affiliated immediately after the
distribution (or any time thereafter); and
(iii) the partnership’s basis in the distributed stock
exceeds the corporate partner’s basis in that stock
immediately after the distribution.343
If Code Sec. 732(f) applies, the distributed corporation must reduce its asset bases by the smaller of (A)
the excess noted in (iii) above, or (B) the amount by
which the sum of the money and adjusted basis of
property held by the distributed corporation exceeds
the corporate partner’s basis in the distributed corporation’s stock.344 To the extent that the distributed
corporation cannot reduce its adjusted basis in its
assets by that full amount (which may occur because
it holds too much cash), the corporate partner must
recognize gain, and it will increase its basis in the
stock of the distributed corporation by that amount.345
Some may argue that Code Sec. 732(f) could serve
as a substitute for the deemed redemption or distribution rule, but Code Sec. 732(f) has some obvious flaws
and does not adequately address (nor was it intended
to address) the General Utilities repeal.
As one flaw, the basis reduction is limited by the
gross asset basis of the distributed corporation, rather
than its net asset basis.
Example—Gross
Ex
amp e—G
— ro
oss basis
ba s limitation.
lim
m ation. Assume
Assume that
that
partnership
owns
with
ap
a tne ship ow
ns all S sstock
tock w
th a $50 basis
basis
and $20 value, and S has assets with a $130 basis
and $130 value, but also has $110 of liabilities. P
holds a partnership interest with a $20 basis and
$20 value. The partnership distributes the S stock
to P in liquidation of P’s interest. Under Code Sec.
732(b), P takes a $20 basis in the S stock.
Code Sec. 732(f) applies to the distribution because P receives the S stock in distribution from
the partnership, P and S are affiliated immediately
after the distribution, and the partnership’s basis
in the S stock exceeds P’s basis by $30. The basis
reduction is limited to the smaller of $30 (that
excess) or $110 (i.e., $130, S’s gross asset basis,
minus $20, P’s in its S stock). Thus, S must reduce
its asset bases by $30, creating a built-in gain in
its assets.346
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More appropriately, Code Sec. 732(f)(3)(A) should
consider the distributed corporation’s net asset value,
not its gross asset value.
Further, it is not altogether clear how the distributed
corporation would reduce its asset bases. Code Sec.
732(f)(1) provides that the basis reduction is made
in accordance with Code Sec. 732(c). The general
allocation scheme of Code Sec. 732(c)(1) preserves
the basis of inventory and unrealized receivables
to the extent possible. The “reduction” rule under
Code Sec. 732(c)(3) first reduces the basis of built-in
loss assets (in proportion to and to the extent of their
built-in loss) and then reduces the bases of all assets
proportionately. It is not clear whether the reduction
is applied first to assets other than unrealized receivables and inventory (reflecting the priority in Code
Sec. 732(c)(1)) or applies to all assets (reflecting the
scheme in Code Sec. 732(c)(3)).
Code Sec. 732(f) also appears to assume that if stock
of an affiliate is distributed, the partnership’s basis
in the stock reflects the affiliate’s basis in its assets,
which often may not be true, particularly when the
partnership has purchased the affiliate stock. It also
may not be true when the partnership forms the affiliate if Code Sec. 362(e)(2) applies to the formation.
Example—Code
partner in
Ex
xample—
l —Co
Cod Sec. 362(e)(2). P, a p
partnership
PX,
pa
artne
ershiip PX
X ownss a 50-percent
X,
50-percent interest
interest in the
partnership
value. X
p
pa
artneershiip
p with
w a $100
10 basis
is and $100
00 valu
owns
interestt with a $
$130
ow
wns the rema
rremaining
aining partnership
artnersh p intere
basis
b
asis
i aand
nd
d $100
0 value.
val The
he partnership
pa ership owns two
t assets, A
Asset 1 with a $100 basis and $100 value and
Asset 2 with a $130 basis
sis aand
d $100 value.
PX forms corporation S, contributing Asset 2 to
S for all S stock. Assume that Code Sec. 351 applies to the formation. Because S would take a
basis in Asset 2 under Code Sec. 362(a) exceeding its value, Code Sec. 362(e)(2) applies to the
contribution. If PX and S do not make an election
under Code Sec. 362(e)(2)(C), S reduces its basis
in Asset 2 by $30 (the built-in loss) to $100.347
Later, PX liquidates, distributing the S stock to
P and Asset 1 to X. Under Code Sec. 732(b), X
takes a $130 basis in Asset 1, while P takes a
$100 basis in the S stock. Even though P would
receive no basis benefit from S’s liquidation, Code
Sec. 732(f) applies to the distribution because
P receives the S stock in distribution from the
partnership, P and S are affiliated immediately

after the distribution, and the partnership’s basis
in the S stock exceeds P’s basis by $30. Under
Code Sec. 732(f)(1), S reduces its basis in Asset
2 by $30, from $100 to $70, creating an unwarranted gain in the asset.
Thus, Code Sec. 732(f) has a number of flaws, and for
that reason alone, it should not act as a surrogate for
the deemed redemption or distribution rule. More troubling, Code Sec. 732(f) may eliminate corporate-level
gain, inconsistent with the General Utilities repeal, as
is illustrated by the following sequence of examples.
The first example illustrates a serendipitous case where
Code Sec. 732(f) is consistent with the repeal.
Example—Code Sec. 732(f) consistent with the
repeal. Individual X owns all S stock with a $100
basis and $100 value. S owns assets, also with a
$100 basis and $100 value.
Corporation P owns land with a $0 basis and
$100 value. If P sold the land for $100, it would
recognize a $100 gain. Together, therefore P and S
hold assets with an aggregate $100 built-in gain.
X and P form a partnership as 50-percent partners,
with X contributing the S stock and P contributing the land. None of the parties recognize gain
or loss on the contribution, X and P take $0 and
$100 bases, respectively, in their partnership
interests, and the partnership takes a $0 basis in
the land and a $100 basis in the S stock.348
After mo
more
e than seve
seven years,
ear , the p
partnership
r nership liquidates, distributing the land to X and the S stock to
P. Assume that the values and bases of all relevant
assets remain the same. Under Code Sec. 732(a),
X takes a $100 basis in the land, while P would
take a $0 basis in the S stock. Code Sec. 732(f),
however, applies to the distribution because the
partnership’s $100 basis in the S stock immediately before the distribution exceeds P’s $0 basis
in that stock under Code Sec. 732(a) and P and S
are affiliated immediately after the distribution.
Because S’s aggregate basis in its assets is $100,
S reduces its asset bases by $100, from $100
to $0. That basis reduction preserves the $100
corporate-level gain within the system.349
Example—Eliminating corporate-level gain despite Code Sec. 732(f). The facts are the same as
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in the preceding example, except that individual
X has a $0 basis in his S stock. Thus, X owns all
S stock with a $0 basis and $100 value, but S
owns assets with a $100 basis and $100 value. If
S liquidated, it would recognize no gain or loss,
while X would recognize a $100 gain.350

Even before it was modified by Notice 93-2, the
distribution rule in Proposed Reg. §1.337(d)-3 may
have been too narrow to deal with all partnership
transactions that may avoid the General Utilities
repeal, as the following two examples illustrate. Nor
does Code Sec. 732(f) save the day.

Corporation P owns land with a $0 basis and
$100 value. If P sold the land for $100, it would
recognize a $100 gain. Together, therefore, P and
S hold assets with an aggregate $100 built-in gain.

Example—Protracted deferral of corporate-level
gain. P owns all S stock with a $100 basis and
$100 value, and S owns assets also with a $100
basis and $100 value. Individual X owns C stock
with a $0 basis and $100 value, and C owns assets with a $0 basis and $100 value.

X and P form a partnership as 50-percent partners,
with X contributing the S stock and P contributing
the land. None of the parties recognize gain or
loss on the contribution, X and P take $0 bases
in their partnership interests, and the partnership
takes $0 bases in the contributed assets.351
After more than seven years, the partnership
liquidates, distributing the land to X and the S
stock to P. Assume that the values and bases of
all relevant assets remain the same. Under Code
Sec. 732(a), P takes a $0 basis in the S stock.
Code Sec. 732(f) does not apply to the distribution
because
on beca
b
ause P’s basis in the S stock immediately
after
equals the partnership’s
af
f the
fter
th distribution
d
di iib
distri
p
p basis
stock
immediately
before
distribution.
in
n the
e sto
ck im
mm ately be
fore the distribu
Sometime
later,
So
omeetimee lat
ter, P liquidates
quidates S, in a liquidation
quidatio to
Code
apply.
which
hi h Co
Code
d SSecs.
cs 332
2 and 337
37 ap
l P ttakes
k a
$100 b
basis in the S assets, eliminating its built-in
gain in the S stock.352 Thus,
hus the
e overa
overall
all ttransaction
ansaction
eliminates $100 of P’s gai
gain. Through
combinahrough a co
mbinaation of Code Sec. 732(a) and Code Sec. 332, a
corporation (i.e., P) indirectly exchanged an appreciated asset with a $0 basis and $100 value
for assets with a $100 basis and $100 value but
recognized no corporate-level gain.353 Note that
under the distribution rule, as originally proposed, P would have recognized a $100 gain
on the distribution of the S stock, preventing the
elimination of that one level of corporate gain.354
In the preceding example, to the extent that X had a
positive basis in his S stock, Code Sec. 732(f) would preserve corporate-level gain because S would be required
to reduce its asset basis by that X basis amount.355 Thus,
perversely, the extent to which Code Sec. 732(f) would
further the General Utilities repeal would depend on a
fact unrelated to the corporate-level gain.

X and P form a partnership as 50-percent partners,
with P contributing the S stock and X contributing
the C stock. None of the parties recognize gain
or loss on the contribution, X takes a $0 basis in
his partnership interest, P takes a $100 basis in its
interest, and the partnership takes $0 and $100
bases in the C and S stock.356
After more than seven years, the partnership
liquidates, distributing the C stock to P and the S
stock to X. Assume that the values and bases of all
relevant assets remain the same. Under Code Sec.
732(a), X takes a $0 basis in the S stock, while P
takes a $100 basis in the C stock.357 Code Sec.
732(f) does not apply because P’s basis in the C
stock exceeds the partnership’s basis in the stock
immediately before the distribution.
Note,
Note, however,
ho
owever, that
that the
he sequence
sequence of steps
steps may
may
lead
nite
lead to an
an indefi
ind
defin
ni deferral
deferral of corporate-level
corporate-level
gain. P could sell the C stock without gain recognition, while S could sell its assets, also without
gain recognition.358 Arguably that deferral is inconsistent with the General Utilities repeal but
it is not clear how or even whether that deferral
should be addressed.
Example—Exploiting Code Sec. 362(e)(2)(C).
P holds a partnership interest with a $100 basis
and $100 value. The partnership owns a disregarded entity, which holds assets with a $150
basis and $100 value. The partnership checks the
box for the disregarded entity and is treated as
transferring the entity’s assets to a newly formed
corporation (“S”) in a Code Sec. 351 transfer.
Code Sec. 362(e)(2) applies, but S and partnership
make the election under Code Sec. 362(e)(2)(C).
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Thus, the partnership takes a $100 basis in S’s
stock, while S takes a $150 basis in its assets. If the
basis reduction is treated as a Code Sec. 705(a)(2)
(B) expenditure (as Proposed Reg. §1.362-4(c)(6)
concludes), the partners, including P, will reduce
their partnership bases in total by $50. Assume
that P reduces its basis in it partnership interest
by $10, from $100 to $90.359 The partnership then
distributes the X stock to P.360
Under Code Sec. 732(a), P takes a $90 basis in the
S stock. Under Code Sec. 732(f), S must reduce its
basis in its assets by $10, from $150 to $140.361
However, if P and S join in filing a consolidated
return (or if P liquidates S), P has access to the
remaining built-in loss in the S assets. Further,
if P held more than a 50-percent interest in the
partnership, Code Sec. 382 would not limit P’s (or
the P group’s) use of those built-in losses.
To address the concern illustrated by the last
example, the distribution rule may include an antiabuse provision that would require S to conform its
net asset basis to P’s S stock basis if the partnership
and S made the Code Sec. 362(e)(2)(C) election with
a view
ew to
t benefi
bene tting P.
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the following
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Example—Hook interest.
est. P owns a 10-percent
10-percen
nt
interest in a partnership with a $10 basis and
$100 value and X owns all P stock. Assume that
the partnership buys all P stock for $300. P’s indirect interest in the acquired stock is therefore
worth $30 (10 percent of $300). If the deemed
redemption rule applies, P is deemed to exchange
30-percent of its partnership interest with a $3
basis and $30 value for P stock worth $30, recognizing a $27 gain under Code Sec. 311(b).
If the partnership retains the P stock, nothing
else apparently happens, even if it converts P’s
10-percent interest into a preferred but limited
partnership interest. Even with that conversion,
no gain (or loss) would escape corporate solution,
although P’s gain on its partnership interest could
be indefinitely deferred.

Regulations could provide at a minimum that on the
conversion, P recognizes any gain embedded in the
partnership interest to prevent that indefinite deferral.

E. Possible Legislative Targets
The following examples illustrate cases that may merit
a legislative response:
Example—Duplicating loss through a B reorganization. P acquires all of the X stock in exchange
for its voting stock in a B reorganization. Assume
that X has one shareholder, Fred, and his basis in
the X stock was $100, but its value was only $10.
Under Code Sec. 362(b), P takes Fred’s basis in
the X stock or $100. Fred receives solely P stock
in exchange for his X stock. If Code Sec. 354
applies to his exchange, his basis in the P stock
is also $100, even though its value is only $10.
Thus, Fred preserves his loss in the P stock, but
that loss is duplicated for P.
The duplication illustrated by the example appears
inconsistent with Code Sec. 362(e)(2), which targets
the duplication of shareholder loss at the corporate
level. Because the duplication in the example arises
under Code Sec. 362(b), not Code Sec. 362(a), however, Code Sec. 362(e)(2) does not apply, and it is
unlikely that the Treasury and the IRS could issue
regulations under Code Sec. 337(d) to address this
concern, given Code Sec. 362(e)(2)’s breadth. To
address this concern, Congress should amend Code
Sec.
ec. 362(e)(2)
362 e)(2) to
o provide
p ov e that
tha itt applies
app ies to prevent
preven
loss
duplication
oss d
duplication in a B reorganization.
eorganizat o .
Example—Elective basis rules for a split-up? P
owns all stock of S1, S2 and S3 and holds no other
assets. All P stock is owned by Q, a domestic
corporation. P liquidates, distributing all stock of
its subsidiaries to Q. Assume that the liquidation
is described in Code Secs. 332 and 337, as well
as Code Sec. 355.
If Code Sec. 355 applies to the distribution, Q’s
basis in the S1, S2 and S3 stock equals its P stock
basis, allocated among the shares proportionately
by value.362 If, instead, Code Sec. 332 applies to
the distribution, Q succeeds to P’s bases in those
shares.363 Whether Code Sec. 332 or Code Sec.
355 apply to the distribution, neither P nor Q
should recognize gain or loss.364
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Note that Q can assure that Code Sec. 332 applies
to the liquidation by making sure that P holds
some assets other than the subsidiary stock.365
Because Q can functionally elect to apply Code
Sec. 332 to the transaction, arguably it should be
able to elect whether Code Sec. 332 or Code Sec.
355 applies to the liquidation. Congress could
confirm that result.
Example—Elective rules for a reorganization. P
owns all S1 stock with a $0 basis and $100 value,
and S1 owns assets with a $0 basis and $100
value. S1 merges into X, and P receives $40 X
stock plus $60 cash. Assume that the merger qualifies as a Code Sec. 368(a)(1)(A) reorganization.
Under Code Sec. 361(b), S1 recognizes no gain or
loss because it receives stock of a party to the reorganization (the X stock) and boot (the cash) in the
exchange, and it is deemed to distribute the stock
and boot to P, its shareholder. Further, under Code
Sec. 361(c), S1 recognizes no gain or loss on the
deemed distribution. Note that none of Code Secs.
311, 336 or 337 can apply to S1’s distribution.366
Under
ndeer Code
Co
ode Sec. 1032(a), X recognizes no gain
of S1 assets for its stock.
orr los
lloss
ss on
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ac
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e h
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ga n
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gai ($100)
($100
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the
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Although Code Sec. 356 by its terms applies to P,
it appears that Code Sec. 332 may apply as well.367
Code Sec. 361(c)(4) does not expressly prevent
Code Sec. 332 from applying to the deemed liquidation, since it merely prevents the liquidation
rules from applying to the target corporation, not
its shareholders. If, however, Code Sec. 332 applies, P will recognize none of its realized gain.
Although P will take a $0 basis in the X stock (assuming that X and P are not members of the same
consolidated group), the transaction will eliminate
$60 of P’s corporate-level gain without tax.368
Arguably, however, that gain elimination does not
violate the General Utilities repeal because X preserves

S1’s asset basis and P could have eliminated its gain
in its S1 stock before the exchange through a Code
Sec. 332 liquidation. In fact, if P had first liquidated S1
and had then transferred the former S1 assets to X in
a taxable exchange, it would have recognized only a
$100 gain (and X would have taken a cost basis in the
assets).369 In contrast, if Code Sec. 332 applied in the
reorganization transaction in the example, the transaction would preserve a $140 gain, albeit a deferred
gain.370 It is not clear whether the General Utilities
repeal should apply to prevent that deferral, when
an alternative transaction would result in a smaller
recognized gain. Congress could answer that question
through legislation, or perhaps simply provide that
Code Sec. 332 cannot apply to a corporate shareholder
of the target in an acquisitive reorganization.
Example—Avoiding Code Sec. 1059. P has
owned at least 80 percent of the only class of S1
stock since S1 was formed. Thus, P and S1 have
always been affiliated, although they do not join
in filing a consolidated return. Assume that none
of S1’s earnings and profits were generated by
another corporation.
In anticipation of S1’s making a large dividend
distribution, P acquires the remaining S1 stock
for $1,000, taking a $1,000 basis in the newly
acquired S1 stock.371 S1 then declares and distributes a $2,000 dividend, $400 of which is paid
on P’s newly acquired S1 stock. Although the
dividend paid on that stock equals 40 percent of
basis
stock,
Code
Sec. 1
1059
P’s b
as s in tthat
haat st
oc Co
de Sec
059 does not
ot
apply
distribution.
ap
plyy to the d
istr b on.
Under Code Sec. 1059, if a corporation receives
an extraordinary dividend on stock that the corporation has not held for more than two years
before the dividend announcement date, the
corporation must reduce its basis in that stock by
the nontaxed portion of the dividend.372
Extraordinary dividends do not include qualified
dividends on common stock, and the dividend
paid by S1 to P on the newly acquired stock is a
qualified dividend.373 The distribution is a qualified dividend because P and S1 are affiliated at
the close of the distribution date, and the dividend is paid out of earnings and profits generated
in tax years, on each day of which P and S1 were
affiliated.374 Because the dividend is a qualified
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dividend, P is entitled to a 100-percent dividendsreceived deduction. Thus, P’s gross income for
the dividend is entirely offset by its dividends
received deduction.
Because of the dividend, P’s newly acquired S1
stock declines in value to $600, and after holding the stock for more than 45 days,375 assume
that P sells that stock to an unrelated person for
that amount. Because Code Sec. 1059 does not
apply, P retained its $1,000 basis in that stock
and therefore recognizes a $400 loss on its S1
stock sale.
In the preceding example, P enjoys a $400 tax loss
but suffers no economic loss. Although the creation
of that noneconomic loss is inconsistent with the
General Utilities repeal, Congress has implemented
a comprehensive scheme in Code Sec. 1059 to attack
similar losses. Given that scheme, it seems unlikely
that the Treasury has the authority under Code Sec.
337(d) to attack that noneconomic loss, although
Congress could (and should) address it through an
amendment to Code Sec. 1059.

IV.
V. Con
C
Conclusion
ncl
A ccorporation
corporattion recognized
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on
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shareh
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nd
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C
that bears its name. First courts, and then Congress, began eroding the
he doctrine,
ctrine, and
and by 1986,
1986,
its repeal was substantially
tial complete.
complete. Although
Although
Congress offered tantalizing hints, it never defined
the repeal’s scope. Nor have regulations offered a
systematic definition.
At a minimum, the repeal should generally apply if a transaction otherwise eliminates a level of

corporate tax, whether through a distribution, sale
or transfer of an asset. That elimination may occur
through the elimination of gain or the creation of
a noneconomic loss. The repeal should not apply, however, when a statutory provision clearly
provides for gain elimination, and that elimination is consistent with the policy underlying the
provision. The Treasury and the IRS should craft
a regulation of general application that reflects
those principles.
The most signifi cant regulation that currently
implements the repeal is found in Reg. §1.150236, the unified loss rules for consolidated groups.
Although the rules are a technical marvel, they are
extraordinarily complex and sometimes may allow
a group member to recognize a noneconomic loss.
Those rules should be replaced by a simpler loss
disallowance rule modeled on old Reg. §1.150220. To assure the validity of the replacement, the
Treasury and the IRS should gain a Congressional
endorsement of the revised approach.
The Treasury and the IRS have also proposed
regulations to deal with a partnership’s ownership
and distribution of a partner’s stock. The regulations
proposed deemed redemption and distribution rules.
The deemed redemption rule should be retained with
some modifications, but the distribution rule generally should be eliminated. A new distribution rule
should be added in its place, a rule that applies to a
distribution by a partnership to a corporate partner
that results in the partner becoming affiliated with
a subsidiary.
Finally,
legislative
Fina y, Congress
C
Congre
ess should
sho d cconsider
ons de a few leg
islativ
changes
address
questions
about
the
hanges to add
ress lingering
gering que
q
st ons ab
out th
scope of the repeal. These statutory and regulatory
changes will help define the repeal’s scope, answer
important questions that have lingered for over a
quarter of a century, and for consolidated groups,
substantially simplify the law.
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consequences to the liquidating corporation.
132 Cong. Rec. H 8358 (daily ed. Sept.
25, 1986); 132 Cong. Rec. E 3389 (daily
ed. Sept. 2, 1986) (adding that allowing
gain deferral would place new owners “in
a favored position over the old owners”).
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affiliated, nonconsolidated group, P would
not have adjusted its bases in the S1 or S2
stock, and S1 would have essentially made
a nontaxable,
ntax
xable
e, carryover
ca
basis transfer of the
S3
3 stoc
stockk to S2.
SS2
Later
La
ter legislation
legislattion (e
(e.g.,
e.g Code Sec.
ec. 358
358(h) or
Code
C
ode
od SSec.
ec. 362(e))
362(e)
62( )) also
all should
uld be considconsid
ered
ere
ed to furth
further
er thee re
repeal.
Act
Ac
ct Sec.
Sec. 54 of
o the Defi
De cit Reduction
ed
Act of
1984,
9 , P.L.
984,
P 98
98-369,
8-369
9, 98
8 SStat. 568-69.
H.R.
R. (Conf.)
(Co
onf.) Rep.
R No. 98-861, at 821 (1984).
Note that in the 1986 Act, Congress also
rejected a form of surrogate taxation
xatio when
it strengthened Code Sec. 382
82 to limit
mit
loss trafficking by corporations. A
Act Sec.
621 of the 1986 Act, 100 Stat. 2254-2269
(amending Code Secs. 382 and 383). See
also General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, H.R. 3838, 99th Cong.,
at 294-95 (1987) (noting that the purpose
of the amendments was to prevent tax
biases in favor of retaining or selling loss
corporations).
See supra note 49 (explaining why the
better view is that pre-1987 law was consistent with the 1987 amendment, so that
the amendment merely clarified the law).
George K. Yin, Taxing Corporate Liquidations (and Related Matters) After the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, 42 TAX L. REV. 575,
623 (1987) (suggesting this rationale).
See id. (suggesting that rationale but criticizing it because all assets are distributed).
Note that the liquidating corporation can
still choose (or select) to distribute loss
assets to the minority shareholder, thereby
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75

76

77

raising a concern with loss selectivity.
In a Code Sec. 332 liquidation, the liquidating corporation recognizes no gain or
loss on its distribution of property to the
controlling parent with respect to its stock.
Code Sec. 337(a). Without a provision
like Code Sec. 337(b)(1), however, the
liquidating corporation would recognize
gain or loss on its use of property to satisfy
the parent’s debt. Code Sec. 1001. Thus,
it could essentially elect to recognize loss
(or gain) simply by identifying the property
used to satisfy the parent’s debt. See also
supra note 14 (for a further discussion).
See Yin, supra note 72, at 620-625 (stating the non-pro rata rule of Code Secs.
336(d)(1) and 267 have the same underlying theory and that the “disqualified property” rule targets loss duplication). As Code
Sec. 311 does, Code Sec. 336(d)(1) also
mitigates the risk that a corporation and
controlling shareholder would undervalue
distributed property, although Code Sec.
336(d)(1) may not apply in the most problematic case—when the corporation has a
single shareholder—because property will
be distributed pro rata.
Code Sec. 267(b)(2) (providing that an
individual is related to a corporation if
the individual owns, actually and constructively, more than 50 percent of the
corporation’s stock, by value). See also
id., at (b)(3) (treating members of the same
controlled group as related persons); id., at
controlle
(f) (provi
(providing that “controlled group” has
the mean
meaning given in Code Sec. 1563(a),
except, among other things, that “more
than 50 p
percent” is substituted for “at least
80 percent” each place it appears in Code
Sec. 1563(a)).
Perhaps
r aps in
n li
lieu
uo
off ad
adding
g Cod
Code
e Sec.
ec. 3
336(d)
36(d
(1),
(1
), Congress
Co ngres s could
oul have
ave modified
mo difie d the
second
d sentence
t
off Code SSec. 2
267(a)(1)
67(
) tto
provide that Code Sec. 267(a)(1) applied
to disallow a corporation’s loss on any liquidating distributions to a related person.
That modification would have differed from
Code Sec. 336(d)(1) in two ways, however.
First, the modification would have applied
to loss property distributed pro rata, to
the extent distributed to a related person.
Second, it would have afforded the transferee shareholder a possible basis benefit.
Cf. Code Sec. 267(d) (providing that if the
transferor later sells the acquired property
at a gain, the gain is recognized only to the
extent that it exceeds the disallowed loss).
Congress may have chosen to add Code
Sec. 336(d)(1), rather than amend Code
Sec. 267 because the loss disallowance
rule of Code Sec. 267(a)(1) does not apply
in one critical case—when the liquidating
corporation and shareholder are members
of a controlled group. See Code Sec. 267(f).
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80
81
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84

85

86

87

88
89

Instead of the loss being disallowed, it is
deferred and taken into account under
the principles of the consolidated return
regulations (e.g., immediately before the
shareholder leaves the controlled group).
See Code Sec. 267(f)(2); Reg. §1.267(f)-1(c)
(1) (applying the principles of the matching
and acceleration rules for intercompany
transactions under Reg. §1.1502-13).
Accordingly, a liquidating distribution of
loss property to a shareholder who directly
or indirectly owns more than 50 percent
of the liquidating corporation’s stock may
fall under this loss prevention rule.
Code Sec. 336(b)(1)(B).
See Yin, supra note 72, at 628.
Code Sec. 336(d)(2)(B)(i).
Code Sec. 336(d)(2)(B)(ii).
See Yin, supra note 72, at 686 (suggesting that this approach would be a “more
precise mechanism” than was employed
under Code Sec. 1374).
Code Sec. 355(d) was adopted in 1990. See
Act Sec. 11321(a) of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, P.L. 101-508,
104 Stat. 1388-461.
Code Sec. 362(d) also targets gain elimination by limiting a possible duplicate use
of basis. See Sen. Rep. No. 106-2, at 75
(1999). That provision was enacted in Act
Sec. 3001(b)(2) of the Miscellaneous Trade
and Technical Corrections Act of 1999, P.L.
106-36, 113 Stat. 182.
Code Sec. 355(d)(1) and (2). Disqualified
stock includes (i) stock of the distributing
or controlled corporation acquired by purchase within five years of the distribution,
and (ii) stock of the controlled corporation
received in the distribution and attributable
to stock or securities of the distributing
corporation
co
orati n ac
acquired
quir d by p
purchase
rch se with
within
five years
ears of the
the distribution.
dis r ution. Id.,
Id att (d)(3).
d)(3
SSee also
l id., att (d)(5)
(d)(5 (defi
( fining purchase
h
to
include taxable acquisitions and certain
non-taxable acquisitions); id., at (d)(7)
(treating as one person all persons related
under Code Secs. 267(b) or 707(b)(1)); id.,
at (d)(8) (for ownership attribution rules).
H.R. Rep. No. 101-881, at 340-41 (recognition prevented distributing corporations
from “dispos[ing] of subsidiaries in transactions that resemble sales or to obtain
a fair market value stepped-up basis for
any future disposition, without incurring
a corporate-level tax”).
Code Sec. 358(h) was adopted in 2000 and
Code Sec. 362(e) was adopted in 2004. See
Act Sec. 309(a) of the Community Renewal
Tax Relief Act of 2000, P.L. 106-554, 114
Stat. 2763A-638; Act Sec. 836(a) of the
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, P.L.
108-357, 118 Stat. 1594.
See Code Sec. 358(a).
But see Coltec Industries, Inc., CA-FC,
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90

91

92

93

2006-2 USTC ¶50,389, 454 F3d 1340
(finding that a similar transaction lacked
economic substance); Thrifty Oil Co. &
Subsidiaries, 139 TC No. 6, Dec. 59,179
(2012) (denying the duplicate loss as a
double deduction, citing Ilfeld Co. v.
Hernandez, SCt, 4 USTC ¶1261, 292 US
62, 54 SCt 596.
More precisely, Code Sec. 362(e)(2) applies
if the transferee’s aggregate basis in the applicable property received from a transferor
under Code Sec. 362(a) would exceed
the property’s aggregate value. Code Sec.
362(e)(2)(A). Note that Code Sec. 362(e)
(2) disregards any transferred property to
which Code Sec. 362(e)(1) applies.
Code Sec. 362(e)(1) applies, for example, to an inbound transfer of property
described in Code Sec. 361(e)(1)(B) if that
property would otherwise take a net builtin loss basis under Code Sec. 362(a) or (b).
Property is described in Code Sec. 362(e)
(1)(B) if it is not subject to federal income
tax in the transferor’s hands immediately
before the transfer but is subject to such
tax in the transferee’s hands immediately
after the transfer. If Code Sec. 361(e)(1) applies to property, the property takes a basis
equal to its fair market value immediately
after the transaction. Code Sec. 361(e)(1)
(A). Thus, Code Sec. 361(e)(1) targets the
importation
orta
ation of built-in loss.
Code
Co
ode Sec.
SSec 362(e)(2)(A)
3
362(ee)
(for the general
rule
rule eliminating
eliminating the
the net built-in
-in loss at the
corporate
co
orporaate
t level);
le
level);
l) id.,
id at (e)(2)(C)
id.
)(2)(C) (for
(for the
th
election
eleection
n to instead
in
nstead eliminate
e
te the net builtbu
in loss at thee shar
shareholder
reho
level).
eve Note
e th
that
if the
t el
election
ectio
on is ma
m
made
de aand the
he corpo
corporation
tion
liquidates,
uidates, the
the ccorporation’s loss may be
disallowed under Code Sec. 336(d)(1) or
(2). Thus, the election and liquidation
idat
may
have the sad effect of eliminating
ting the loss
in its entirety.
See Code Sec. 1059(c) (defining an extraordinary dividend as a dividend that
exceeds five percent (for preferred stock)
or 10 percent (for other stock) of the stock’s
basis over an 85-day period or 20 percent
over a year). See also id., at (e) (for special
rules for redemptions and certain other
distributions); H.R. Rep. No. 105-48, at
459-60 (1997) (describing a rule added
to Code Sec. 1059(e) to deal with a redemption treated as a dividend when the
redeemed shareholder received options,
noting a transaction involving Seagrams
and DuPont).
Code Sec. 1059(a)(1). Code Sec. 1059 was
enacted in 1984. See Act Sec. 53(a) of the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, P.L. 105-34,
98 Stat. 565. H.R. Rep. No. 98-432, Pt. II,
at 1185 (1984) (justifying Code Sec. 1059
to prevent the creation of a loss that may
effectively convert taxable income into

94

95

96
6

97

98

99

tax-exempt income).
Code Sec. 1059(a)(2). Until 1997, that
excess created negative basis, which was
taken into account when the stock was
sold. Congress changed Code Sec. 1059
to require immediate recognition because
it concluded that the gain deferral was
“inappropriate.” See Act Sec. 1011(b) of
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, P.L. 10534, 111 Stat. 912 (making the change);
H.R. Rep. No. 105-48, at 460 (1997) (calling the deferral inappropriate); General
Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of
the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, H.R.
4170, at 138 (noting that Code Sec. 1059
targeted “tax motivated transactions such
as ‘dividend stripping,’” where a corporation could “obtain a dividends received
deduction without bearing the economic
risk of holding the dividend paying stock”).
Code Sec. 243(a)(1) and (c) (providing an
80-percent dividends received deduction
for a corporate shareholder for dividends
received from a domestic corporation in
which the corporate shareholder owns at
least 20 percent of the stock, disregarding Code Sec. 1504(a)(4) stock). Cf. Code
Sec. 243(a)(3) (providing a 100-percent
dividends received deduction for qualifying dividends); id., at (b)(1)(B) (providing
that a qualifying dividend must be paid
out of earnings and profits for a tax year
on each day of which the distributee and
distributing
ut
corporations were affiliated);
Code Se
Sec. 246(c) (providing a minimum
holding period to qualify for the dividends
received
ed deduction).
That ove
overall benefit equals the $1,400,000
benefit from the loss minus the $280,000
tax on the dividend.
X p
paid
aid $10
$10,000,000
00 0,0
for tthe
e stoc
stock
k an
and
receives
re
c ive s $10,000,000
$1 0 00,
of proceeds
pr cee s for
the stock
t k ($4,000,000
($4 00 0
as a dividend
i d d plus
l
$6,000,000 in sales proceeds).
Thus, its basis in the T stock would be
reduced from $10,000,000 to $6,800,000.
Note that the $4,000,000 dividend would
be an “extraordinary dividend,” because P
would not own the T stock for more than
two years before the dividend announcement date and the dividend would equal 40
percent of P’s adjusted basis in the T stock.
The seller could avoid the gain if T instead
paid the dividend to the seller and the seller then sold the T stock to P. That dividend
should not be treated as part of the sales
price, at least if T declared the dividend
before P and the seller negotiated the T
stock sale. See Rev. Rul. 75-493, 1975-2
CB 108 (respecting as a separate step a
distribution of unwanted cash to a seller
before a binding sales contract was executed where the buyer did not indirectly
fund the distribution, refusing to follow

J.E. Casner, CA-5, 71-2 USTC ¶9651, 450
F2d 379). Compare Waterman Steamship
Corp., CA-5, 70-2 USTC ¶9514, 430 F2d
1185, cert. denied, 401 US 939 (1971)
(concluding that a dividend of a note from
a target corporation to a selling target
shareholder was part of the consideration
for target stock where the buyer paid off
the note) with Litton Industries, Inc., 89
TC 1086, Dec. 44,357 (1987), acq. in
result (pre-sale distribution respected as a
dividend; distribution announced before
sales negotiations began).
100
Stated differently, P should not take the loss
into account as a surrogate for the seller
because its tax benefit from the loss would
exceed the seller’s tax cost for the gain.
101
For example, Code Sec. 332 may allow the
elimination of a corporate shareholder’s
gain. See also Code Secs. 1032; 1014; Cf.
Code Sec. 243.
102
This rule should be more than just an
anti-abuse rule. Gain recognition cannot
be avoided merely because the taxpayer
has a strong nontax business purpose for
a transaction that triggers gain.
103
See Code Sec. 337(d) (providing a broad
grant of regulatory authority to “carry
out the purposes of” the repeal); H.R.
(Conf.) Rep. No. 99-841, at II-204 (1986)
(reflecting that broad grant, including that
the regulations may deal with tax-free
reorganizations).
104
Moreover, enforcement is more likely to be
uneven, so that similarly situated taxpayers
are more likely to be treated differently.
105
Code Sec. 1031(a)(1). Although P is also
transferring the P stock for T assets, P
should be treated as exchanging the land
for T’s land under the priority scheme established
ta
hed in
n Re
Reg.
g. §§1.1031(j)-1(a)(2).
1 31(j 1(a 2). Und
Under
tthat scheme,
cheme, tto
o th
the eextent
xtent poss
possible,
ible lik
likekind property
t is treated
t t d as exchanged
h
d for
like-kind property. See also Reg. §1.10601(b)(8) (describing the priority scheme for
payment of boot when Code Secs. 1031
and 1060 both apply to an asset sale).
106
Code Sec. 1001(a).
107
See Rev. Rul. 77-337, 1997-2 CB 305
(providing that Code Sec. 1031 does not
apply to a taxpayer who acquired property
following a Code Sec. 333 liquidation and
immediately exchanged the property); Rev.
Rul. 77-297, 1977-2 CB 304 (providing
that Code Sec. 1031 does not apply to a
taxpayer who acquires property solely to
make the like-kind exchange); Rev. Rul.
75-292, 1975-2 CB 333 (concluding that
Code Sec. 1031 did not apply to a taxpayer who exchanged like-kind property
and transferred the property received to a
newly formed, wholly owned corporation
in a Code Sec. 351 transfer because the
taxpayer did not plan to hold the property
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received for a qualified purpose). Cf. J.R.
Bolker, CA-9, 85-1 USTC ¶9400, 760 F2d
1039 (concluding that property received
in a Code Sec. 333 liquidation in which
the shareholder took a transferred basis
could be considered held for investment
when it was held for three months and later
exchanged in an exchange planned at the
time of the liquidation); B.B. Maloney, 93
TC 89, Dec. 45,863 (1989) (concluding
that a corporation made a Code Sec. 1031
exchange when it exchanged like-kind
property and 26 days later liquidated in
a Code Sec. 333 liquidation because the
shareholder took a transferred basis in
the property and intended to retain it; the
court distinguished a liquidation in which
gain or loss was recognized because the
transferred property in the latter liquidation
was “cashed out”).
108
In no case would that corporation recognize loss on the receipt of the boot. Code
Sec. 361(b)(2).
109
Code Sec. 361(c)(2)(A).
110
Code Sec. 361(c)(2)(B). Stock, stock rights,
or obligations of a party to the reorganization (other than the distributing corporation) are nonqualifying property unless
received by the target in the reorganization exchange.
111
Code Sec. 358(a). See Code Sec. 362(b)
(second
ond
d sent
sentence).
ten
112
Code
Co
ode SSec.
ec 358(a)(1)
ec.
358(a)( and (2). See also id.,
at (f) (providing
(provid
ding that
that although
h the boot
b
is
received
recceive
i ed
d without
wiithout
th t gain
ga recognition,
cognition it is
i
not
no
ot treated
treaated as
a nonrecognition
non
nrec
on property
ty for
purposes
pu
urposees of Codee Sec.
Se 358(a)(1)).
8(a)
113
Stated
Sta
ated differe
d
differently,
ently,
y, th
the
e no
nonrecognition
cognition rules
ules
of Code Sec
Sec.
c. 36
361 and the basis rule of
Code Sec. 362(b) are each integral parts
of the same regime. Note that alt
although
gh P
preserves a $25,000 gain in the
e lan
land transansferred from T, that gain is properly
l traced
d
to P’s realized gain in its surrendered land,
not the land transferred by T.
114
Under the boot relaxation rule of Code
Sec. 368(a)(2)(B), a transaction may be
a C reorganization even if the acquiring
corporation uses boot, if that corporation
acquires at least 80 percent of the target assets for its voting stock. Because X acquires
90 percent of the S1 assets for its voting
stock, the boot relaxation rule applies and
the transaction may be a C reorganization.
115
Code Sec. 368(b).
116
Code Sec. 361(b)(1) (providing that no gain
is recognized if a party to a reorganization
exchanges property for boot and stock of
another party to the reorganization if it
distributes the boot pursuant to the plan of
reorganization); id., at (b)(2) (providing no
loss is recognized); id., at (b)(3) (providing
that transfers of boot by a target corporation to its creditors in connection with the

reorganization are treated as distributions
pursuant to the plan of reorganization).
117
Code Sec. 361(c)(1) (providing generally that
the target recognizes no gain or loss on distributions of property to shareholders pursuant
to the plan of reorganization); id., at (c)(2)(A)
(providing an exception for distributions of
appreciated property other than qualified
property); id., at (c)(2)(B)(ii) (providing that
qualified property includes stock of a party to
the reorganization received by the distributing corporation in the exchange).
118
S1’s basis in the GainCo stock is determined under Code Sec. 358(a)(2) and
therefore equals its fair market value when
received. See also Code Sec. 358(f) (providing that for purposes of Code Sec. 358,
property permitted to be received under
Code Sec. 361 without the recognition of
gain or loss includes only stock or securities of another party to the reorganization).
Code Sec. 358 applies because S1 received
the stock as part of a Code Sec. 361 exchange. See Code Sec. 358(a).
119
Code Sec. 1032(a).
120
Code Sec. 1001(c).
121
Code Sec. 362(b).
122
Code Sec. 368(c) (defining “control”).
123
That section applies to a corporation that
acquires property in connection with a
reorganization, but only if the corporation
acquired that property, in whole or in part,
in exchange for its stock or securities or
stock or ssecurities of its controlling parent.
124
4
Note tha
that if S1 had a basis in the GainCo
stock less than its value, it would recognize
that diffe
difference as gain on the distribution;
Code Sec
Sec. 361(c) does not protect S1 from
gain recognition because the GainCo stock
is not qualified property. Cf. Code Sec.
361(c)(3)
3
61 c)(3 (tr
(treating
ating a transfer
ansfe o
of qua
qualifi
lified
property
p
o ert by a corporation
orp
ion to
o itss cr
creditor
ditor
iin connection
ti
with
ith a reorganization
i ti
as a
distribution to its shareholders pursuant to
a plan of reorganization).
125
Code Sec. 1001(c).
126
Id.
127
Note that the duplicated loss may also be
attacked as a “double deduction.” Reg.
§1.1016-6(a) (providing that “[a]djustments must always be made to eliminate
double deductions or their equivalent”).
See also Ilfeld Co., Chas. v. Hernandez,
SCt, 4 USTC ¶1261, 292 US 62, 54 SCt 596
(denying a double deduction to a consolidated group); Thrifty Oil Co. & Subsidiaries, 139 TC No. 6, Dec. 59,179 (2012)
(citing Ilfeld to deny a double deduction to
a consolidated group). Cf. Rite Aid Corp.,
CA-FC, 2001-2 USTC ¶50,516, 255 F3d
1357, reh’g denied, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
23207 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2001) (refusing to
find a prohibited “double deduction” when
one deduction was taken by a consolidated

group on its sale of subsidiary stock and
another was preserved in the subsidiary
attributes).
128
See Code Sec. 354(a)(2)(C)(i) (treating
nonqualified preferred stock as boot for
these purposes).
129
Cf. Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1975-2 CB 118 (concluding that shareholders who received
solely boot in a merger treated as an acquisitive reorganization took the boot into
account under Code Sec. 302(a)).
130
The preceding example illustrates a concern that would arise even in the absence
of Code Sec. 362(e)(2). A similar example
that illustrates a shortcoming of Code Sec.
362(e)(2) is discussed below. See supra
”III. Implementing the Repeal—E. Possible
Legislative Targets.”
131
But cf. Code Sec. 338(h)(10); Reg. §1.338(h)
(10)-1(d)(5)(iii) (under which a shareholder
may recognize no gain or loss on its sale
of target stock (but may recognize gain or
loss on the target’s deemed liquidation).
132
Code Sec. 332(a).
133
See H.R. (Conf.) Rep. No. 99-841, at II199-200 (1986) (providing that gain or loss
is generally recognized on a liquidating
sale or distribution of assets); id., at II-204
(noting that Code Sec. 338(h)(10) may
provide relief from the multiple taxation
of the same economic gain that may otherwise occur when appreciated corporate
stock is sold); General Explanation of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, H.R. 3838, 99th
Cong., at 348 (1987) (stating that “Congress believed that it was appropriate ...
to require recognition when appreciated
property, including stock of a subsidiary,
is transferred to a corporate or individual
recipient outside the economic unit of the
selling
se
g or di
distributing
r buti g grou
group”);
); Paul, sup
supra
note 53, aatt 603.
n
603
134
1
4
FFor example,
l assume that
th t P owned
d all
ll S
stock with a $60 basis and $100 value and
S owned assets also with a $60 basis and
$100 value. P could sell the S stock to X for
$100, recognizing a $40 gain. S could then
sell its assets for $100, also recognizing a
$40 gain. If P liquidated and the liquidation was described in Code Sec. 331, P’s
shareholders might also recognize gain. A
tax could be imposed on each of the three
gains, a result that would be the same before
or after the repeal. Of course, the repeal
makes it more difficult to avoid extra levels
of tax because following the repeal a liquidating corporation generally recognizes any
realized gain (or loss) on its distributions in
liquidation. Code Sec. 336(a).
135
Code Sec. 332(a). Note that this discussion
assumes that the parent and subsidiary are
domestic corporations.
136
Code Sec. 243(a)(3) and (b) (describing
the 100-percent dividends received de-
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duction (DRD) for qualifying dividends);
Reg. §1.1502-13(f)(2)(ii) (for distributions
between consolidated group members). But
see Code Sec. 243(b)(1)(B) (providing that
a qualifying dividend must be paid out of
earnings and profits of a tax year after 1963,
on each day of which the distributing and
shareholder corporations were members of
the same affiliated group; thus, the 100-percent DRD may not apply to earnings and
profits attributable to a target acquired in
a Code Sec. 368 reorganization).
137
Rev. Rul. 75-521, 1975-2 CB 120 (noting
that the plan adoption occurred immediately after the purchase). Cf. G.L. Riggs,
Inc., 64 TC 474, Dec. 33,283 (1975) (concluding that Code Sec. 332 applied to the
liquidation of a corporation that adopted a
formal plan of liquidation after it redeemed
stock of minority shareholders when a
parent corporation became affiliated with
the subsidiary because of the redemption).
But cf. Rev. Rul. 70-106, 1970-1 CB 70
(concluding on essentially the same facts
that the subsidiary adopted an informal
plan of liquidation before it redeemed the
stock held by minority shareholders).
138
H.R. (Conf.) Rep. No. 99-841, at II-202
(also referring to an affiliated group as an
“economic unit”).
139
Act Sec. 631(b) of the 1986 Act, 100 Stat.
2272.
2. See also
al
H.R. (Conf.) Rep. No.
99-841,
99
9 841, at II-204
9-841
III 204
4 (1986) (describing the
purpose
pu
urposee of Code
C
Sec.
SSec 338(h)(10)
10) to “offer[]
er[]
ttaxpayers
axxpayeers re
relief
elief
li f fr
ffrom
rom a potential
tential mu
multiple
tipl
taxation
tax
xation
n of tthe
he sa
same
ame economic
om gain”).
).
140
0
Reg.
Re
eg. §1
§1.338(h)(10)-1T(a)
.338(h)(10
0)-1
(1987).
198
141
Act
Ac
ct Sec
Secs.
cs. 13
3 and
d 1
14
4 o
of thee Revenue
Revenu Act
of 1936
6 (the
e “19
“1936 Act”), P.L. 74-740, 49
Stat. 1655-57 (providing graduated rates
for the corporate normal tax and surtax);
tax);
id., at §1, 49 Stat. 1652 (providing
ding that this
amendment applied to tax years b
beginning
after December 31, 1935). See also Act
Sec. 102(a) of the Revenue Act of 1935
(the “1935 Act”), 49 Stat. 1015 (providing
graduated corporate tax rates; this provision was superseded by the 1936 Act). By
1938, Congress had limited the benefit of
graduated rates primarily to corporations
with annual net income less than $25,000.
Act Secs. 13 and 14, Revenue Act of 1938,
P.L. 75-554, 52 Stat. 447, 455-57.
142
H.R. Rep. No. 74-1681, at 3 (1935) (quoting the President’s message to Congress
dated June 19, 1935; the President also
asserted that “smaller corporations should
not carry burdens beyond their powers”);
S. Rep. No. 74-1240, at 3 (quoting the
same message).
143
Cf. Act Sec. 128(a) of the Revenue Act of
1943, P.L. 78-235, 58 Stat. 47-48 (introducing Code Sec. 129, the predecessor
to current Code Sec. 269, which, among

other things, allowed the IRS to make
appropriate adjustments if a person or
persons acquired control of a corporation
with “the principal purpose” to evade
or avoid federal income tax). But cf. Act
Sec. 102 of the Revenue Act of 1934 Act,
48 Stat. 702-03 (imposing an additional
surtax (i.e., an accumulated earnings tax)
on a corporation “formed or availed of for
the purpose of preventing the imposition
of the surtax upon its shareholders” by accumulating, rather than distributing, gains
or profits).
144
Act Sec. 26(b) of the 1936 Act, 49 Stat.
1664 (providing for an 85-percent DRD);
id., Act Sec. 1, 49 Stat. 1652 (providing
that this amendment applied to tax years
beginning after December 31, 1935). See
Act Sec. 102(h) of the 1935 Act, 49 Stat.
1016 (providing for a 90-percent DRD;
this provision was superseded by the 1936
Act). See also H.R. Rep. No. 74-1681, at
3 (1935) (quoting the President’s message
to Congress dated June 19, 1935, which
stated that “[p]rovision should be made
to prevent the avoidance of such graduated tax on corporate income through
the device of numerous subsidiaries” and
that “[t]he most effective method of preventing such evasions would be through
a tax on dividends received by corporations”); 1948 Study of the Division of Tax
Research of the U.S. Treasury Department,
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Returns and Intercorporate
lid
Dividends,
end reprinted in 124 INTERNAL REVENUE ACT
CTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950
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As a more direct and complete response,
Congress could have required related
corporations to share one set of graduated rates. It finally adopted that strategy
in 1964 when it enacted Code Sec. 1561.
See Act Sec. 235(a) of the Revenue Act of
1964, P.L. 88-272, 78 Stat. 116-17 (the
“1964 Act”).
145
Cf. Code Sec. 1059.
146
Code Sec. 331(a) (for the loss on liquidation). In other words, just as the parent can
move from nonaffiliated to affiliated status
with a subsidiary, it can do the reverse.
147
Granite Trust Co., CA-1, 57-1 USTC ¶9201,
238 F2d 670 (citing to Sen Rep. No. 83-255
(1954)). It also noted that if Congress had
opposed the result reached in an earlier
“well-known” case that supported electivity, Day & Zimmermann, Inc., CA-3, 45-2

¶9403, 151 F2d 517, it would have
made appropriate changes when it enacted
Code Sec. 332. Id., at 675-76 (suggesting
that if Congress had not intended to follow
Day & Zimmerman, it would have incorporated an “end-result” provision in Code
Sec. 332).
148
Id., at 676-77.
149
See supra note 139.
150
Note that duplicate loss is limited if a
parent disaffiliates a consolidated subsidiary. See Reg. §1.1502-36. A similar rule
does not apply to the disaffiliation of a
nonconsolidated subsidiary, but the case
for such a rule is weaker because the nonconsolidated parent and subsidiary do not
combine tax items and are therefore less
like a single entity.
151
See, e.g., Code Sec. 381(a).
152
See supra notes 141 to 144 (and accompanying text).
153
See Code Sec. 336(a). But see id., at (d).
154
See Paul, supra note 53, at 576-81 and
584-89 (for a discussion of upstream and
downstream transactions).
155
Cf. Rev. Rul. 78-47, 1978-1 CB 113 (considering a downstream reorganization
under Code Sec. 368(a)(1)(C)); Paul, supra
note 53, at 585-86 (also discussing the
Petrie Stores transaction).
156
Note that if the upstream transfer occurs by
merger, all assets and liabilities (including
contingent liabilities) of the merged corporation become assets and liabilities of the
survivor, perhaps providing a substantive
difference from a liquidation alternative.
157
See Paul, supra note 53, at 585 (calling
the difference between the liquidation and
reorganization in this case “ephemeral”).
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Institute 2011) (discussing how an excess
loss account can be avoided through
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Code Sec. 355 distribution that precedes
a Code Sec. 355 distribution outside the
group); Don Leatherman, Liquidating
into Multiple Distributee Members, 24
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SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS AND RESTRUCTURINGS 1998 Ch.
188 (Practicing Law Institute 1998).
159
See Reg. §1.1502-20(a) (2001). As a
corollary, the group reduced its basis in
subsidiary stock on the subsidiary’s deconsolidation to the extent that basis exceeded
value. See id., at (b).
160
See id., at (a)(4).
161
See id., at (c).
162
Under Reg. §1.1502-20, the Treasury’s “general approach” was “to phase out separate
return treatment as the group and the subsidiary enjoy[ed] the benefits of consolidation.”
CO-93-90, 1990-2 CB 696, 700. Thus, the
Treasury treated subsidiary stock as an indirect interest in subsidiary assets. It adopted
a single-entity approach, the likely effect of
which was to eliminate the group’s loss on
its disposition of the stock of a long-standing
subsidiary but not its loss on a disposition of
the subsidiary’s assets.
163
Rite Aid Corp., CA-FC, 255 F3d 1359
(2001). The Federal Circuit reversed the
United States Court of Federal Claims,
which found the regulation a proper exercise of regulatory authority. See Rite Aid
Corp., CA-FC, 2001-2 USTC ¶50,516, 255
F3d 1357.
164
Rite Aid Corp., CA-FC, 2001-2 U S T C
¶50,516, 255 F3d 1357, 1358. Code Sec.
1502
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(1985),
85), acq. 198
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single-entity approach when regulations
expressly required a different resu
result).
166
Rite Aid Corp. , 46 FedCl 505 (also
also pointing
ting
out that a deemed or actual assett sale could
ld
avoid duplicated gain but that without Reg.
§1.1502-20 a “regular” stock sale could
preserve duplicated loss).
167
Id.
168
Rite Aid Corp., CA-FC, 2001-2 U S T C
¶50,516, 255 F3d 1357, 1360.
169
Rite Aid Corp., CA-FC, 2001-2 U S T C
¶50,516, 255 F3d 1357, 1360 (also stating
that Rite Aid’s stock loss “does not stem
from the filing of a consolidated return,
and the denial of the deduction imposes
a tax on income that would not otherwise
be taxed”). The court therefore accepted
Rite Aid’s argument that Code Sec. 1502,
though a broad regulatory grant, “does
not include discretion to deny the Code’s
benefits without furthering the purpose of
that section.” Rite Aid Corp., 46 FedCl 500,
504 (2000) (setting out this argument).
170
Rite Aid Corp., CA-FC, 2001-2 U S T C
¶50,516, 255 F3d 1357, 1359 (citing

S. Rep. No. 70-960, at 15 (1928), which
stated that “[m]any difficult and complicated problems, however, have arisen in
the administration of the provisions permitting the filing of consolidated returns”).
In the 1928 legislation, Congress granted
Treasury the authority to issue consolidated return regulations “clearly to reflect”
income and “prevent avoidance of tax
liability.” Act Sec. 141(b) of the Revenue
Act of 1928, P.L. 70-562, 45 Stat. (pt. 1)
791, 831.
171
Id., at 1359-60.
172
Id.
173
See Don Leatherman, Why Rite Aid is
Wrong, 52 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
811 (2003) (for a more extended discussion
of Rite Aid).
174
Although Rite Aid’s stock loss was reduced
because of the added compensation, the
Rite Aid group still enjoyed an additional
benefi t from the inside subsidiary loss,
equal to at least that added compensation
minus the tax on its last dollars of taxable
income equal to that compensation.
175
The Federal Circuit in Rite Aid never
acknowledged the tension created by the
General Utilities repeal between treating
subsidiary stock as a separate asset or as
an indirect interest in subsidiary assets, essentially concluding without analysis that
the stock had to be treated as a separate
asset. It makes sense, however, to treat
a consolidated
conso
parent’s subsidiary stock
as an indirect
in
interest in the subsidiary’s
assets. Even
Ev more than a nonconsolidated
parent and
a
subsidiary, the consolidated
parent and
an subsidiary should be treated as
part of an economic unit. See supra notes
135-140 and accompanyingg text (for a
general
g neral discussion
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on of
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theory).
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Act Sec. 844(a) of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (the “2004 Act”), P.L.
108-357, 118 Stat. 1600. See also id., at
844(c) (providing that the change applies
to all tax years, including those before the
enactment of the 2004 Act).
177
H.R. (Conf.) Rep. 755, 108th Cong., 2d
Sess. 640 (2004). Cf. Rite Aid Corp.,
CA-FC, 2001-2 USTC ¶50,516, 255 F3d
1357, 1360, reh’g denied, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 23207 (Oct. 3, 2001) (justifying its
invalidation of the “duplicated loss” piece
of Reg. §1.1502-20 because it did not deal
with a “consolidated” problem).
178
Act Sec. 844(b) of the 2004 Act, P.L. 108357, 118 Stat. 1600 (stating that notwithstanding the amendment, “the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 shall be construed

by treating Treasury Reg. §1.1502-20(c)
(1)(iii) (as in effect on January 1, 2001) as
being inapplicable to the factual situation
in [Rite Aid]”). See H.R. (Conf.) Rep. 755,
108th Cong., 2d Sess. 640 (2004) (stating
that the amendment “nevertheless allows
the result of the Rite Aid case to stand
with respect to the type of factual situation
presented in the case”).
179
See H.R. (Conf.) Rep. 755, 108th Cong.,
2d Sess. 640, note 595 (2004) (also stating
that “[i]n exercising its authority under
section 1502, [Treasury] is ... authorized
to prescribe rules that protect the purpose
of General Utilities repeal using presumptions and other simplifying conventions”).
180
Id., at 640 (providing that the Treasury
may issue regulations providing “that
inside attributes [may be] adjusted when
a subsidiary leaves a group”). Cf. Act Sec.
836(a) of the 2004 Act, P.L. 108-357, 118
Stat. 1594-95 (adding Code Sec. 362(e)(2),
which generally limits loss duplication in a
Code Sec. 351 exchange by reducing the
controlled corporation’s attributes).
181
See Andrew J. Dubroff, Jerred G. Blanchard,
Jr., Marc A. Countryman, and Steven B.
Teplinsky, F EDERAL I NCOME T AXATION OF
CORPORATIONS FILING CONSOLIDATED RETURNS,
Ch. 73A (Matthew Bender 2012) (for an
exhaustive discussion of the regulation).
See also Don Leatherman, A Survey of
§1.1502-36, 24 TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE A CQUISITIONS , D ISPOSITIONS , S PIN -O FFS ,
JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS
AND RESTRUCTURINGS 2009 1027 (Practicing
Law Institute 2009) (for a discussion of
the regulation and more examples that
illustrate concerns with the regulation).
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02-36(b 1 i)
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IId.
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Id., at (b)(2) (introductory language).
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Id., at (f)(10)(i).
187
Id., at (f)(10)(i)(A). See also id., at (e)(3) (for
a special rule that applies to an intercompany sale of an S loss share).
188
Id., at (f)(10)(i)(B). For this purpose, “group”
refers to a consolidated group, not merely
an affiliated group. See, e.g., Reg. §1.150236(b)(3), Ex. 3(i). Cf. Reg. §1.1502-1(a)
(providing that, except as the context
requires, references to a group are to a
consolidated group). Thus, M and S must
be members of the same consolidated
group, not just the same affiliated group.
189
Id., at (f)(10)(ii)(A) (providing that this rule
applies to Code Sec. 332 intercompany
liquidation only if M is the only member
that owns S shares).
190
Id., at (f)(10)(ii)(B).
191
In other words, each share of common
stock owned by a member has the same
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ratio of basis to value. Common and preferred stock have the same meanings as
under Reg. §1.1502-32(d)(2) and (3). Reg.
§1.1502-36(f)(8). See Reg. §1.1502-32(d)
(2) (defining preferred stock generally as
“stock that is limited and preferred as to
dividends and has a liquidation preference”); id., at (d)(3) (defi ning common
stock as stock that is not preferred stock).
192
Reg. §1.1502-36(b)(1)(ii)(A). Note that this
exception does not apply if the members’
preferred stock has built-in gain or loss merely
because of a fluctuation in market rates.
193
Id., at (b)(1)(ii)(B) (also applying if, in one
fully taxable transaction, either the stock
becomes worthless under Code Sec. 165
and Reg. §1.1502-80(c) or the stock is in
part sold to nonmembers and in remaining
part becomes worthless). See 73 FR 53938
(Sept. 17, 2008) (stating that, because of
this exception, the basis-redetermination
rule should apply to only a small number
of cases). Note that a transaction “includes
all the steps taken pursuant to the same
plan or arrangement.” Reg. §1.1502-36(f)
(9). Thus, as this exception makes clear,
a transaction can include dispositions of
shares to more than one person.
194
Reg. §1.1502-36(b)(1)(ii)(B). See also id.,
at (e)(5)(i) and (ii) (for the mechanics of the
election). The election may make sense if
it increases
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Reg. §1.1502-36(b)(2)(i). The
h amounts
t
reallocated are the net positive or negative
adjustments for a year. See id., at (b)(3), Ex.
4. For this purpose, investment adjustments
include adjustments for taxable income or
loss, tax-exempt income and nondeductible, noncapitalizable items but exclude
adjustments for distributions. Id., at (b)(1)
(iii). See also Reg. §1.1502-32(c)(1)(iii).
See also Reg. §1.1502-36(b)(3), Ex. 4 (illustrating that adjustments for distributions
are not taken into account); id., at (c)(8),
Ex. 1(iv)(C) (to the same effect); id., at (c)
(8), Ex. 6(C) (to the same effect). They also
include amounts reflected in the basis
of the share (whether or not under Reg.
§1.1502-32) and adjustments previously
reallocated to (but not adjustments previously reallocated away from) the share
under the basis-redetermination rule. Id.
(also noting that they include adjustments
reflected in the exchanged basis of a share,

such as under Code Sec. 358 following a
Code Sec. 355 transaction). Finally, they
include amounts specially allocated under
Reg. §1.1502-32(c)(1)(ii)(B) (accounting for
the “prior use” limitation). Id., at (b)(1)(iii).
Note, however, that if a member distributes loss property to another member,
the distribution may ultimately trigger two
types of negative adjustments, one for the
distribution itself and one to account for
the built-in loss in the distributed property.
See Reg. §1.1502-32(b)(2)(iv) (for distributions); id., at (b)(3)(iii) (providing that loss
not recognized under Code Sec. 311(a) is
a noncapital, nondeductible expense). See
also Reg. §1.1502-13(f)(2)(iii) (providing
that the principles of Code Sec. 311(b)
apply to a subsidiary’s loss, as well as gain,
from an intercompany distribution of property). Although any negative adjustment
for a distribution should be not be taken
into account, a negative adjustment for the
built-in loss should be a reallocable adjustment under the basis-redetermination rule.
196
Id., at (b)(2)(i)(A). These amounts are reallocated in the third step below.
197
Id., at (b)(2)(i)(B). To the extent a negative
adjustment is reallocated from a share, the
group increases its basis in that share. See
Reg. §1.1502-32(b)(2).
198
Id., at (b)(2)(i)(B).
199
Id., at (b)(2)(ii)(A). The order of these
reallocations helps minimize basis disparity, giving
vin flexibility to allocate negative
adjustments
me
to (and positive adjustments
away fro
from) shares with built-in loss. Cf. id.,
at (b)(2)(iii)(A)
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(iii) (discussed in the text that follows,
providing how the reallocation takes value
into account in determining the allocation
among shares).
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Id., at (b)(2)(iii)(A) (providing that the overall allocation must reduce basis disparities). See also id., at (b)(2)(i)(B); id., at (b)
(2)(ii)(A); id., at (b)(2)(ii)(B) (providing that
the allocations in each step must be “made
in a manner that, to the greatest extent
possible, reduces the disparity among”
members’ basis in S common or preferred
shares, as appropriate). 73 FR 53939 (Sept.
17, 2008) (stating that the reallocation may
be made using “any reasonable method or
formula that is consistent with the basis
redetermination rule and furthers the purposes of the Unified Loss Rule,” adding
that the regulations “contemplate that more

than one result may be reasonable in any
specific case”).
202
Reg. §1.1502-36(b)(2)(iii)(A).
203
Thus, under Reg. §1.1502-32, at least $100
of positive adjustments are allocated each
S3 share, but because of the distributions,
each share still retains a $100 basis. See
Reg. §1.1502-32(b)(2)(i) and (iv).
204
Share 1’s value equals $5, which is $100,
its beginning value, plus five percent of
the built-in gain on Asset 3 ($5), minus
100 percent of the built-in loss on Asset
1 ($100). Share 2’s value equals $105,
which is $100, its beginning value, plus
five percent of the built-in gain on Asset 3
($5). Share 3’s value equals $190, which is
$100, its beginning value, plus 90 percent
of the built-in gain on Asset 3 ($90).
205
S3 remains in the P group because the
retained S3 interests constitute 100 percent
of the voting power of the S3 stock and
over 98.33 percent of its value. See Code
Sec. 1504(a)(2) (for the affiliation definition). Thus, neither P nor S2’s S3 interest
is considered to be transferred because of
S1’s sale.
206
Reg. §1.1502-36(b)(2)(i)(A) (providing for
the reallocation of positive adjustments
from transferred loss shares to other
shares); id., at (b)(2)(iii) (providing that
the reallocations are made to reduce basis
disparity to the greatest extent possible).
207
Allocations of adjustments between classes
of common stock take into account the
terms of each class and other relevant
facts. Reg. §1.1502-32(c)(2) (providing that
within each class of stock, each share is
allocated the same proportion of any adjustment but that allocations among classes
are made by considering the terms of each
class and ot
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See id., at (d)(2) and (3). Further, shares
of stock constitute a class if they have the
same material terms. Id., at (d)(1).
All of the S3 interests should be common stock because none of the interests
is limited and preferred as to dividends.
Further, because Share 1 bore the entire
built-in loss in Asset 1, it is a different class
of stock than the other S3 shares. Because
Share 1 bore that burden, under Reg.
§1.1502-32(c)(2)(ii), that share should be
allocated the entire investment adjustment
related to the corresponding loss.
208
Perhaps, $95 of the loss could be denied
as a double deduction, although that result
is not certain because it appears that the
regulation, which is greatly detailed and
highly technical, specifically allows the
deduction. See Woods Investment Co., 85
TC 274, Dec. 42,315 (1985) (allowing a
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double deduction when a specific regulation allowed the deduction); Thrifty Oil Co.
& Subsidiaries, 139 TC No. 6, Dec. 59,179
(2012) (citing Woods Inv. with favor). See
also supra note 127 (for a further discussion
of double deductions).
209
Reg. §1.1502-36(c)(1) (stating that the basis
reduction is limited “to the net unrealized
appreciation reflected in the share’s basis
as of the transfer”).
210
Id., at (c)(2). Note that the basis reduction
should be a nondeductible basis recovery
that is treated as a noncapital, nondeductible expense for purposes of Reg. §1.150232(b)(2)(iii). See Reg. §1.1502-32(b)(3)(iii)
(B) (providing that, if consistent with the
purposes of the basis reduction provision
and Reg. §1.1502-32, the reduction is
treated as a noncapital, nondeductible
expense if it is not otherwise taken into
account in computing the subsidiary’s
stock basis and is permanently eliminated
in computing the subsidiary’s taxable
items). See also Reg. §1.1502-36(a)(3)(ii)
(A) (providing that basis reductions under
Reg. §1.1502-36(c) tier up to higher-tier
members, implying that the reductions are
noncapital, nondeductible expenses under
Reg. §1.1502-32).
211
Reg. §1.1502-36(c)(3).
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Cf. Reg. §1.743-1(d) (for the determination
of a transferee’s share of the partnership’s
inside basis).
215
Reg. §1.1502-36(c)(5) (providing that,
except as provided in Reg. §1.1502-36,
that determination is made by taking into
account all other applicable rules, even if
the adjustments required by those rules are
not deemed effective until after the transfer,
such as under Reg. §1.1502-28).
216
A loss carryover is “any net operating or
capital loss carryover that is attributable
to S, including any losses that would be
apportioned to S under the principles of
Reg. §1.1502-21(b)(2) if S had a separate
return year.” Reg. §1.1502-36(f)(6). See
also Reg. §1.1502-21(b)(2)(iv) (defining the
portion of a consolidated net operating loss
attributable to a member).

217

A deferred deduction is any deduction or
loss that would have been taken into account under general tax accounting principles as of the time of the transaction but
that is deferred, for example, under Code
Secs. 267(f), 469, or Reg. §1.1502-13. Reg.
§1.1502-36(f)(2). It also includes S’s share
of “deferred” consolidated tax attributes
(e.g., its share of any consolidated excess
charitable contribution). Finally, it includes
equivalent amounts, such as adjustments
under Code Sec. 475 or Code Sec. 481. Id.
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Id. A liability generally means a liability
that has been incurred within meaning of
Code Sec. 461(h). Id., at (f)(5).
219
Reg. §1.1502-36(c)(5) (also providing that
the share’s basis is adjusted for any other
related or resulting adjustments to the
share’s basis).
220
Id., at (c)(6).
221
Cf. Reg. §1.337(d)-2(a)(4) (allowing the
netting of gain and loss on stock with the
same materials terms sold as part of the
same plan or arrangement).
222
Reg. §1.1502-36(c)(7).
223
Id.
224
See supra note 210 and accompanying text
(for a description of that rule).
225
Reg. §1.1502-32(b)(2)(i) and (b)(3)(i).
226
Reg. §1.1502-36(b)(1)(ii)(B).
227
That amount equals the $30 positive adjustment for the income recognized on the
inventory sale. Id., at (c)(3).
228
The disc
disconformity amount equals the
excess o
of P’s $100 S stock basis over the
$100 of net inside attributes (i.e., the $70
asset bas
basis plus the $30 cash). Id., at (c)(4).
229
9
See id., aat (d)(2) and (3).
230
Note that even if the land could not be
sold, the Y group may have recognized a
loss
ss on the
he land
and if iit had
d so
sold
d the
he S stoc
stock
aand
d joined
oi ed with
w
wi the purchaser
rcha er in
n making
making
a Code
C d Sec. 33
338(h)(10)
(h)
election.
l t
231
Id., at (d)(3)(i).
232
Id.
233
Id., at (d)(2)(ii) (providing that the common parent may elect to not have this de
minimis rule apply). The group may elect
to apply the attribute-reduction rule, for
example, so that it can reattribute the attributes of S (or a lower-tier subsidiary). See
73 FR 53941 (Sept. 17, 2008) (preamble
to the final regulations) (making this suggestion).
234
Id., at (d)(2) and (3)(ii).
235
Id., at (d)(3)(ii)(A); id., at (d)(2)(i) (applying
the attribute-reduction rule after taking
into account the basis-redetermination
and basis-reduction rules and all other
applicable rules of law).
236
Id., at (d)(3)(iii)(A). Thus, this factor takes
into account the full aggregate inside loss,
rather than just the portion attributable
to the transferred shares. The preamble

to the proposed regulation states that the
full amount is taken into account because
the basis of the transferred shares, in some
cases, may reflect a disproportionate
amount of the duplicate inside loss. REG157711-02, 72 FR 2980 (Jan. 23, 2007) (the
preamble). See also Reg. §1.1502-36(d)(8),
Ex. 9(v) (for an example where transferred
stock reflected a disproportionate amount
of the duplicate inside loss).
237
Id., at (d)(3)(iii)(B) (generally defining
those amounts for the basis reduction and
attribute reduction rules in the same way);
id., at (c)(5). See also supra notes 216 to
218 and accompanying text (for further
information on S’s net inside attribute
amount). Note that for purposes of the
attribute-reduction rule, loss carryovers
do not include any losses waived under
Reg. §1.1502-32(b)(4). Id., at (f)(6) (defining loss carryovers). That exclusion makes
sense because the waiver eliminates any
chance that the waived loss could provide
a duplicate benefit.
238
Id. See infra notes 263 to 265 and accompanying text (for a discussion of deemed basis).
239
Id., at (d)(4)(i). This fourth category of
assets is more precisely all assets other
than those described in Reg. §1.338-6(b)
(1). The assets described in that regulatory
provision are cash and general deposit accounts, other than certificates of deposit.
Reg. §1.338-6(b)(1).
240
Reg. §1.1502-36(d)(4)(iii). See generally
Reg. §1.1502-36(d)(8), Ex. 1–4 (illustrating these rules). Thus, the reductions do
not affect the stock basis of S’s upper-tier
subsidiaries. Cf. Reg. §1.1502-32(b)(2)(iii)
(providing that noncapital, nondeductible
expenses are negative adjustments).
241
Id., att (d
Id
(d)(4)(ii)(A)(1)
4)(ii (A) 1)) (providing
prov din th
that
at tthe
eelection
on tto specify
specify the
h allocation
allocation is made
mad
as provided
id d iin R
Reg. §§1.1502-36(e)(5)).
150 36 )(5)) FFor
each subsidiary for which the election is
made, a statement must specify which of
the subsidiary’s losses or deferred deductions are being reduced (or, alternatively,
not reduced). Id., at (e)(5)(iv).
242
Id., at (d)(4)(ii)(A).
243
Id., at (d)(4)(ii)(A)(1). Cf. Reg. §1.172-4(a)
(3) (providing that loss carryovers are
absorbed in the order of the taxable years
from which the losses are carried). Note
that loss carryovers are available for reduction even if their use is limited (or barred)
by Code Sec. 382 or by a SRLY limitation.
244
Reg. §1.1502-36(d)(4)(ii)(A)(1).
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
Id., at (d)(4)(ii)(B)(1). That allocation, and
other special rules relating to lower-tier
subsidiary stock are described beginning
at section III.C.2.c.iii of this article.
248
Id., at (d)(4)(ii)(B)(2).
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Id. (also providing that Classes II-VII are
defined in Reg. §1.338-6(b)). See also 73
FR 53942 (Sept. 17, 2008) (concluding
that this approach makes sense because
it is administrable and “duplicated loss is
generally more likely to be reflected in the
basis of” goodwill and going concern value,
so that “the elimination of the basis in those
assets first seems particularly appropriate”).
Note that in this allocation, no amount is
allocated to lower-tier subsidiary stock.
Class II assets are certifi cates of deposit, foreign currency, U.S. government
securities, publicly traded stock, and any
other actively traded personal property (as
defined in Code Sec. 1092(d)(1) without
regard to Code Sec. 1092(d)(3)); Class III
assets are accounts receivables and the
like; Class IV assets are inventory and the
like; Class VI assets are Code Sec. 197
intangibles other than goodwill and going
concern value; and Class VII assets are
goodwill and going concern value; Class
V assets are any other noncash assets. Reg.
§1.338-6(b)(2)(ii)-(vii).
250
Reg. §1.1502-36(d)(4)(ii)(B)(2).
251
Id., at (d)(4)(ii)(C)(1) and (2). For this purpose, a liability is “any liability or obligation the satisfaction of which would be
required to be capitalized as an assumed
liability by a person that purchased all of
S’s assets
sse
ets and
and assumed all of S’s liabilities
in
n a single
singgle transaction.”
traansacti
Id. Thus, this definition
tio
on prominently
pro
omineently may
ma includee “contingent”
m
contin nt
liabilities.
lia
li
abiliti
bilities. See
See id
Se
id.,
d at
d.,
a (d)(8),
), Ex.
E 4 (f
(for
or aan
example
ex
xample with
h “unaccounted
“unaacc
d for”
f
liabilities).
itie
252
2
Id.,
Id
d., at ((d)(4)(ii)(C)(1)
d)(4)((ii)(C)(1) (emphasis
has added).
d).
253
Because
Be
ecausee P sti
still
ll own
owns
ns 80 p
percent
ent of only class
of S stock,
sto
ock, S is still
st a member of the P consolidated group. See Code Sec. 1504(a)(2).
254
The basis-redetermination rule
e d
does not
apply because each share of S’s
’s on
only class
lass
of stock has the same ratio of basis
i to
t value.
Reg. §1.1502-36(b)(1)(ii)(A). The basisreduction rule does not apply because the
transferred share has a $0 disconformity
amount (i.e., its $200 basis equals its allocable share of S’s asset basis ($200 or
one-fifth of $1,000). Id., at (c)(2)(i) and (4).
255
The net stock loss equals $100, the excess
of (A) $200, the aggregate basis of the
transferred S share, over (B) $100, its aggregate value. Id., at (d)(2) and (3)(ii).
256
S’s aggregate inside loss equals the excess,
if any, of (A) its net inside attribute amount
(NIAA) over (B) the value of the S share. Id.,
at (d)(3)(iii)(A). Because S has no lower-tier
subsidiary stock, its NIAA equals $1,000, its
basis in its asset. See id. Thus, S’s aggregate
inside loss equals $500, the excess of its
$1,000 NIAA over the $500 S stock value.
257
Id., at (d)(4)(ii)(B)(2).
258
Reg. §1.1502-32(b)(2)(i) and (b)(3)(i). See
also id., at (c)(1)(iv) (providing that the

portion of an adjustment allocated to a
nonmember has no effect on the basis of
the share). Cf. id., at (c)(1)(ii)(A) (special
allocation to account for elective reattribution under Reg. §1.1502-36(d)); id., at (c)
(1)(ii)(B) (special allocation to account for
investment adjustments subject to a prior
use limitation).
259
Under the facts of the example, the basisredetermination rule would not apply
because each share of S’s only class of
stock has the same ratio of basis to value.
Id., at (b)(ii)(A). The basis-reduction rule
would not apply because each transferred
S share had a $0 net positive adjustment.
Id., at (c)(2)(i).
260
The $80 noneconomic loss is attributable
to the portion of the $400 asset loss allocated to the S share no longer owned by
the group. See Reg. §1.1502-32(c)(1)(iv).
261
See supra note 208 (for reasons why the
noneconomic loss should not be disallowed as a double deduction).
262
See Reg. §1.1502-36(d)(8), Ex. 5–9 (illustrating rules relating to lower-tier subsidiaries). The article includes this description of
the lower-tier subsidiary stock rules, among
other reasons, to illustrate their complexity.
263
Id., at (d)(5)(i)(A) and (B).
264
Id., at (d)(5)(i)(B). See also id., at (f)(1)
(providing that “allocable portion” has the
same meaning as in Reg. §1.1502-32(b)
(4)(iii)(B)); Reg. §1.1502-32(b)(4)(iii)(B)
(providing
din that within each class of stock,
each sha
share has the same allocable portion
of the rrelevant amount and allocations
among classes
c
are made by considering
the term
terms of each class and other relevant
facts relating to the overall economic arrangement).
265
Reg.
eg §1
§1.1502-36(d)(5)(i)(C).
1502 36
6(d)
)(C).
266
2
Id.,
Id
., att (d)(4)(ii)(B).
)(4)( i) )
267
See id.,
d att (d
(d)(5)(ii).
)( (ii)
268
Id., at (d)(5)(ii)(B) (providing that liabilities
include those described in Reg. §1.150236(d)(4)(ii)(C)(1) (e.g., contingent liabilities)). Note that this computation is made
separately for each lower-tier subsidiary,
the stock of which S holds. Id., at (d)(5)
(introductory language).
269
Id., at (d)(5)(ii)(B) (providing that liabilities
include those described in Reg. §1.150236(d)(4)(ii)(C)(1)). Among other things,
these modifications of deemed basis
eliminate the value of lower-tier assets that
S would not take into account if it owned
them directly.
270
Id., at (d)(5)(iii)(A). See REG-157711-02,
72 FR 2981 (Jan. 23, 2007) (stating in the
preamble to the proposed regulations that
the recognition establishes that the share’s
basis no longer reflects noneconomic loss).
271
Reg. §1.1502-36(d)(5)(iii)(A)-(D).
272
Id., at (d)(5)(iv) (adding that such portion is

not treated as a noncapital, nondeductible
amount for purposes of Reg. §1.1502-32
and does not result in gain or loss to S).
273
Id., at (d)(5)(v).
274
Id. Thus, a portion of the amount allocated
to any of L’s G shares will be taken into
account by G under the special lower-tier
subsidiary rules, and a portion of G’s allotment may be allocated to G’s lower-tier
subsidiary shares and taken into account
by those lower-tier subsidiaries under those
special rules, and so on.
275
See, e.g., id., at (d)(8), Ex. 5–7 (illustrating
these rules). See REG-157711-02, 72 FR
2981 (Jan. 23, 2007) (stating in the preamble
to the proposed regulations that those rules
are intended to eliminate the “full duplication potential ... without creating a noneconomic gain in the corresponding attribute”).
276
Reg. §1.1502-36(d)(5)(v)(B)(1).
277
Id., at (d)(5)(v)(B)(2).
278
Id., at (d)(5)(v)(B)(3) (adding that the
aggregate basis for those shares is fi rst
determined after taking into account any
reduction under Reg. §1.1502-36(d)).
279
Id., at (d)(5)(v)(B)(4) (adding that the
aggregate basis for those shares is fi rst
determined after taking into account any
reduction under Reg. §1.1502-36, including under Reg. §1.1502-36(d)). Thus, this
rule may limit L’s attribute reduction when
L has pre-acquisition, unrecognized builtin gain.
280
Id., at (d)(5)(vi)(A) (adding that L’s NIAA
is computed after taking into account any
reductions under Reg. §1.1502-36(d)).
281
Id., at (d)(3)(B) (also providing that computation is made by taking Reg. §1.150236(d)(5) into account but without regard
to Reg.
g §1.1502-36(c)(6)). See supra notes
216 to
21
o 218
218 and accompanying
accompany
om
ng text
t xt (for
( or the
t
definition
d
ition of NIAA
NIAA under
under Reg. §1.1502§1 150
36(c)(5)).
3
(5))
282
Id., at (d)(vi)(A). See id., at (d)(4)(ii)(A)(1)
(for the suspension rule).
283
Id., at (d)(5)(vi)(A).
284
See id., at (d)(5)(v)(B) (election not to
restore L attributes); id., at (d)(5)(vi)(B)
(election not to restore L stock basis). See
also id., at (e)(5)(v) and (vi) (for the form
of these elections).
285
However, it may be advantageous to elect
not to restore an L loss carryover that is
likely to expire unused because the expiration could otherwise cause a reduction
in stock basis. See Reg. §1.1502-32(b)(3)
(iii) (treating an expired loss carryover as
a nondeductible, noncapital expenditure);
id., at (b)(2)(iii) (treating a nondeductible,
noncapital expenditure as a negative
adjustment). See also id., at (b)(4) (providing for a waiver of loss carryovers of an
acquired subsidiary, which may result in
a stock basis reduction).
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Id., at (d)(6). See id., at (d)(8), Ex. 8 (illustrating those elections).
287
Id., at (d)(6)(i)(A) (also providing that it
may reduce any amount in excess of a
stated amount).
288
Id., at (d)(6)(i)(B); id., at (d)(6)(iv)(A).
289
Id., at (6)(iv)(A).
290
Note that the approach in Reg. §1.1502-20
could be modified to make it less harsh
(e.g., by considering net positive adjustments, rather than positive adjustments,
as a disallowance factor).
291
See supra note 178 and accompanying text
(for why legislative may be needed).
292
See Glenshaw Glass Co., SCt, 55-1 USTC
¶9308, 348 US 426, 75 SCt 473.
293
Cf. Rev. Rul. 99-57, 1999-2 CB 678. That
increase prevents P from indirectly recognizing that excluded dividend amount on
a sale of its PX interest.
294
Code Sec. 1032; Rev. Rul. 99-57, 1999-2
CB 678.
295
See id. Again that increase prevents P from
indirectly recognizing that gain on a sale
of its PX interest.
296
Reg. §1.704-3(a)(7).
297
Reg. §1.705-2(b)(1).
298
See Proposed Reg. §1.337(d)-3(d) (for the
deemed redemption rule); id., at (e) (for
the distribution rule).
299
Id., at Reg. §1.337(d)-3(d)(1).
300
Id., at (d)(2).
(d
d)(2).
301
Id.,
d.., at Reg.
Reg §1.33
R
§§1
§1.337(d)-3(h),
337
Ex. 1.
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NYSBA
NY
YSBA Tax SSectio
Section,
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“Report on the Im
Impact
pact
of Legis
Legislative
slativee Ch
Changes to Subchapter K on
the Proposed ‘May Company’ Regulations
under section 337(d) and Technical
hni
Recommendations Regarding Affiliate Stock”
ck”
(Aug. 15, 2012), reprinted in 20
2012 TNT
NT
159-9 (“NYSBA report”). See also NYSBA
Tax Section, “Report on Proposed Regulations Implementing Notice 89-37” (Mar. 3,
1993), reprinted in 93 TNT 57-27; NYSBA
Tax Section, “Report on Notice 89-37” (Nov.
14, 1989), reprinted in 89 TNT 240-5.
304
NYSBA report, supra note 303, at *16.
305
Id.
306
Id. Note, however, that if P is solvent, the P
stock held by the partnership has value, value
that a rational creditor may exploit to help
satisfy its claim against P. Note as well that
the corporate contraction theory flows from
the following incontrovertible point: If the
partnership were to liquidate, to the extent
that P received its stock, its pool of assets
would shrink. Perhaps, however, that point
better supports applying a deemed redemption rule when the liquidation occurs.
307
Id., at *16-*17 (noting that “[s]ection 721
is intended to provide nonrecognition on

the view that people are mixing their assets
for a non-tax purpose. ... [P] stock cannot
be used for operations and would seem
to be a peculiar type of investment asset
to contribute to a partnership. In general,
there seems to be little reason for [P] stock
to go into a partnership other than to effect
an economic redemption of the stock”).
In a sense, the deemed redemption
rule automatically applies the deemed
sales rule of Code Sec. 707(a)(2)(B), an
automatic application that may be justified by the absence of a nontax business
purpose. Nevertheless, in limited cases,
there may be nontax business reasons for
P stock to be contributed or acquired by
a partnership in which P is a partner. For
example, if P is a small partner in an investment partnership, the partnership may
acquire P stock as part of its portfolio of
investments. Further, a partner (other than
P) may contribute P stock to the partnership to facilitate borrowing. But see id.,
at *17 (discounting the latter purpose).
Exceptions to the deemed redemption
rule could be provided in those limited
cases, at least if there was adequate assurance that the P stock would not be
distributed to P.
308
Id.
309
Monte A. Jackel and Audrey Ellis, Perpetually Proposed: The May Company
Regulations, 2012 TNT 63-12, at *3-*4
((noting,, among
a
other things, that since the
rregulations
io were proposed, the following
changes were made: Code Secs. 704(c)
(1)(B) an
and 737 apply for seven, not just
five year
years, after contribution, Code Sec.
731(c) was added to the Code, Code Sec.
732(c) was revised to make it harder to
sshift
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ba is aaway
way from
fro P stock,
sto k and Code
SSec.
c 734(d)
7 4(d) makes
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dist bute
llow-basis
b
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t to a hi
high-basis
h b i partner
t
but keep the high basis of partnership
property intact); Monte A. Jackel, Aggregate View of Partnerships in May Company
Proposed Regs, 137 TAX NOTES 679, 680
(Nov. 5, 2012) (“Jackel article”) (adding
that Code Sec. 707(a)(2), as illustrated by
Reg. §1.707-3(f), Ex. 8, may also provide
a backstop); NYSBA report, supra note
303, at *15 and *17 (pointing to Code Sec.
755(c) and Code Sec. 7701(o)).
310
Under Code Sec. 311(a), a corporation
cannot recognize loss when it uses built-in
loss property to redeem its stock.
311
Cf. Proposed Reg. §1.337(d)-3(d)(1).
312
See Code Sec. 704(c).
313
In appropriate cases, Code Sec. 707(a)(2)
may treat P’s transfer of the loss property
as a redemption.
314
Assume that the other assets maintain their
value. Thus, P’s interest is worth $80.20,
$79.20 related to the P stock (99 percent

of $80) and $1 related to the other assets
(0.5 percent of $200).
315
Note that this change could benefit P if the
P stock had appreciated in value.
316
Proposed Reg. §1.337(d)-3(c) (defining a
corporate partner and another corporation as affiliates if they are members of
the same affiliated group, as defined in
Code Sec. 1504(a) without regard to the
exceptions in Code Sec. 1504(b)). Notice
93-2, 1993-1 CB 292 (providing that affiliation is determined immediately before
the relevant transaction). Note that for
this purpose, stock also includes options,
warrants, and similar interests. Proposed
Reg. §1.337(d)-3(c). The concerns raised
in the text for stock also generally apply
to options, warrants, and similar interests.
317
Cf. Code Sec. 1032(a) (applying to a corporation’s sale or exchange of its stock). See
also Reg. §1.1502-13(f)(2)(ii) (excluding
an intercompany distribution from gross
income but only if the distributee has
corresponding negative adjustment in the
stock of the distributing corporation); id., at
(f)(6) (providing that a member recognizes
no loss on common parent stock).
318
NYSBA report, supra note 303, at *18. See
also id., at *25 (proposing that the amount
of the stock deemed redeemed be reduced
if the affiliate owns less than a 100-percent
direct and indirect interest in P).
319
Id., at *20-*22.
320
Id., at *22-*23 (more precisely recommending that the rule apply if the combination is a Code Sec. 332 liquidation or
Code Sec. 368 reorganization).
321
Id., at *23.
322
Id., at *24.
323
Id. (describing this example).
324
Id.
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P
owns all S1 and S2 stock. P and S1 form
a partnership, with P contributing the S2
stock and S1 contributing an appreciated
asset. The report sensibly concludes that
the deemed redemption rule should not
apply to this case because any concern that
arises (i.e., a mixing bowl concern) does not
depend on P’s contributed asset being stock
of an affiliate. Id., at *26. The report notes
that if the P group is a consolidated group,
in an appropriate case, the anti-avoidance
rule under Reg. §1.1502-13(h) may apply.
Id., at *27.
325
Note that in at least one respect, the affiliate rule may be too narrow because it
may allow a corporate partner to avoid the
application of Code Secs. 304 and 311(b).
If a corporation directly acquires stock
for appreciated property in a transaction
described in Code Sec. 304, the corporation must recognize gain under Code Sec.
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311(b). The acquired stock, however, may
not be stock of an affiliated group member.
See Code Sec. 304(a) and (c) (requiring
that the persons or persons transferring
the stock control the target and acquiring
corporations; control broadly requires only
50-percent ownership). Subject to an antiabuse rule, a corporate partner might avoid
Code Sec. 311(b) by having the partnership
acquire the target stock. Cf. Reg. §1.3681(e)(5) (in measuring continuity of interest,
treating an acquisition by a partnership as
a proportionate acquisition by a partner).
326
Reg. §1.337(d)-3(e).
327
NYSBA report, supra note 303, at *27-*28.
Note that if the distribution rule is eliminated, the deemed redemption rule may
still apply to a distribution.
If, however, the deemed redemption rule
is not retained, the distribution rule will
be needed to help prevent the avoidance
of the General Utilities repeal. See Jackel
article, supra note 309, at 683 (adding that
deemed redemption rule is fundamentally
inconsistent with the disguised sale rules
and Code Sec. 704(c) because it applies
the aggregate approach). Note that eliminating the deemed redemption rule and
keeping the distribution rule would be
administratively simpler but would fail
to fully implement the repeal. See supra
notes
es 304-312
304-31
12 and
a accompanying text (for
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discussion).
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n
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Proposed Reg. §1.337(d)-3(h),, Ex. 1.
333
Id.
334
Code Sec. 705(a)(2). One more refinement
would be required. The examples in the text
all involve P stock that had a fair market
value basis when P acquired its indirect
interest in that stock through the partnership. P’s adjustment should more precisely
reflect the difference between the stock’s
fair market value at that time and the stock’s
value when distributed. Cf. Reg. §1.7042(b)(iv)(f) (describing “reverse Code Sec.
704(c) allocations); Reg. §1.705-2 (basis
adjustments coordinating Code Secs. 705
and 1032).
335
Code Sec. 731(a). If P had been allocated
a loss and reduced the basis of its partnership interest, P would recognize gain on
the distribution, an appropriate result since
the reduced basis would be attributable to
P’s indirect interest in its stock.
336
Code Sec. 732(b) (providing that a partner’s
basis in noncash property distributed in

liquidation of a partner’s partnership interest equals the partner’s basis in that interest
minus any distributed cash).
337
Code Secs. 351(a); 358(a).
338
Code Sec. 362(a).
339
For Code Sec. 351 to apply to the incorporation, the partnership must hold
the entity’s stock “immediately after” the
exchange. It is not clear to what extent the
distribution may affect that “immediately
after” requirement, but the partnership may
be treated as holding the “stock” for as long
as it held the interests in the disregarded
entity. Note that in applying Code Sec. 269,
it appears that if there was a good business
reason to form (or acquire) the disregarded
entity, Code Sec. 269 should not apply to
the “check the box” election.
340
Notice 93-2, 1993-1 CB 292.
341
As originally proposed, the distribution
rule measured affiliation immediately
after the transaction. Reg. §1.337(d)-3(c).
Notice 93-2, 1993-1 CB 292, required
that affiliation be measured immediately
before the transaction.
342
The legislative history makes clear that
Code Sec. 732(f) is concerned not with the
avoidance of the General Utilities repeal but
instead with avoiding a low basis assigned
under Code Sec. 732. S. Rep. No. 106-201,
at 50 (1999). It applies only to the extent that
the basis that the corporate partner takes in
affiliate stock is less than the partnership’s
basis in
n that stock immediately before
the distribution.
distr
Congress may have been
particularly concerned with transactions in
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primarily
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32(
(A)
345
Code Sec. 732(f)(4).
346
Note that if P had directly acquired the S
assets for $20 plus the assumption of the
S liabilities, S would have recognized no
gain or loss and P would have taken a $130
basis in the acquired assets. Code Secs.
1001; 1012.
347
Code Sec. 362(e)(2)(A).
348
Code Secs. 721; 722; 723.
349
Code Sec. 732(f)(1). If S, instead, had a $0
inside asset basis, before the sequence of
steps, there would be $200 of corporatelevel gain, $100 for P and $100 for S. Code
Sec. 732(f) would still apply to the distribution, but S would not reduce its asset basis
because its asset basis before any reduction
would be $0. Code Sec. 732(f)(2) (for the
limitation on any basis reduction). Instead,
P would recognize a $100 gain. Id., at (f)
(4) (providing for gain recognition to the
extent that basis is not reduced). After that

gain recognition, however, S’s assets would
still have a $0 basis, preserving the $100 of
corporate-level gain as yet unrecognized.
350
Code Secs. 336; 331.
351
Code Secs. 721; 722; 723.
352
See Code Secs. 334(a); 332(a).
353
Cf. Code Secs. 311(b); 336(a). Note that
the General Utilities repeal is aimed at
corporate-level, not shareholder-level,
recognition. Even though X’s basis in the
land preserves a $100 built-in gain, the
sequence of steps has eliminated $100
of corporate-level gain. In effect, without
recognizing gain, P has transferred an asset
with a $0 basis, acquiring an asset with a
$100 basis. These steps therefore thwart
the purposes of the repeal—to assure that
corporate-level gain does not escape tax.
354
Even if the aggregate basis of S’s assets was
less than $100, the sequence of steps would
eliminate $100 of corporate-level gain (i.e.,
P’s pre-sequence gain reflected in the land),
although any built-in gain in the S assets
would be preserved in the transaction.
355
More precisely, it would be required to
reduce its basis by the partnership’s basis
in the S stock, but that basis would equal
X’s basis in the S stock before the partnership was formed. Code Sec. 722. On the
partnership’s liquidation, P would take
a basis in the S stock under Code Sec.
732(a) of $0. Code Sec. 732(f) would
therefore apply because P would receive
a distribution of the S stock, be affiliated
with S immediately after the distribution,
but the partnership’s basis in that stock
immediately before the distribution would
exceed P’s basis in that stock under Code
Sec. 732(a). Under Code Sec. 732(f)(1), S
would be required to reduce its asset basis
by thee excess.
excess Note
No e that
hat if X had
ad a loss
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basis in tthe
b
e S stock,
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he C
Code
ode SSec.
ec. 732
732(f)
penalty
t would
ld create additional
dditi
l corporatelevel gain, a result certainly not mandated
by the General Utilities repeal.
356
Code Secs. 721; 722; 723.
357
Under the distribution rule before its modification, P would also recognize no gain
because its basis in its partnership interest
would equal the value of the C stock.
358
To avoid an arguably comparable deferral,
Code Sec. 351 requires gain in contributed assets to be duplicated at both the
shareholder and corporate level. If it was
preserved only at the shareholder level,
the corporation could sell the contributed
asset without gain, while if it was preserved
only at the corporate level, the shareholder
could sell the stock received without gain.
Thus, with gain preserved at only one level,
Code Sec. 351 could be easily used to
avoid gain. The example in the text would
not allow such facile avoidance, however,
because, among other things, assets subject
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to unpredictable shifts in value would have
to remain in partnership solution for at
least seven years.
359
Note that in certain cases the other partners
may be indifferent about any reduction in
their outside bases.
360
Assume that the control requirement under
Code Sec. 351 is met.
361
Under the distribution rule, as originally
proposed, P would recognize a $10 gain.
362
Reg. §1.358-2(a)(2).
363
Code Sec. 334(b)(1).
364
See Code Secs. 332; 337; 355(a) and (c).
365
See Code Sec. 355(b)(1)(B).
366
Code Sec. 361(c)(4) (providing that Code
Sec. 311 and subpart B of part II of subchapter C (i.e., Code Secs. 336 and 337)
do not apply to the distribution).
367
Cf. Rev. Rul. 69-6, 1969-1 CB 104 (provid-

ing that if a target merges into a corporation
in a taxable transaction, the target is treated
as selling all assets and distributing the sales
proceeds to its shareholders in liquidation).
Note, however, that because Code Sec. 356
is the more “specific” provision, it arguably
should apply.
368
Under Code Sec. 358, P’s basis in the X
stock would be a negative $60, equal to
$0 (the basis of its transferred assets) minus $60 (the value of the boot received).
However, because P and X do not join in
filing a consolidated return, the X stock
basis cannot be less than $0.
369
Assuming that the liquidation qualifi ed
under Code Secs. 332 and 337, neither P
nor S1 would recognize gain or loss, and P
would take a transferred $0 basis in the S1
assets. Code Sec. 334(b)(1). On its taxable

transfer of those assets, therefore, P would
recognize a $100 gain.
370
Note that if Code Sec. 332 did not apply in the reorganization transaction, the
transaction resulted in a $160 gain, $100
of which was deferred and $60 of which
was recognized.
371
Code Sec. 1012.
372
Code Sec. 1059(a)(1); id., at (b) (defining
the non-taxed portion); id., at (c) (generally
defining extraordinary dividends).
373
Id., at (e)(2)(A). Cf. id., at (c)(2)(B) (for an
exception if the dividend is paid out of
earnings and profits earned or accrued by
a corporation when it was not affiliated
with the distributee shareholder).
374
Code Sec. 243(b)(1) (defining qualifying
dividends).
375
Cf. Code Sec. 246(c)(1).
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